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 Résumé 
Avec l’échec des négociations entre les États-Unis et la Corée du Nord, 
menées depuis le début des années 1990, sur la question du nucléaire, le problème 
est devenu graduellement l’affaire des pays voisins, tous soucieux de l’avenir de la 
région du sud-est asiatique. Présentée comme le seul allié de la Corée du Nord, la 
China a été invitée à participer à des négociations à trois, à quatre (1997-1998), et à 
six (2003-2007), dans l’espoir de faire entendre raison au régime isolé, mais 
jusqu’à maintenant, aucune des tentatives n’est parvenue à satisfaire chacun des 
membres à la table. Alors que la tension monte et que la politique américaine se fait 
de moins en moins flexible, la Chine quant à elle, continue d’encourager le retour 
des négociations à six (Six-Party Talks) dans l’optique de dénucléariser la péninsule 
coréenne, tout en travaillant à maintenir ses liens avec la Corée du Nord. Le fil 
conducteur de cette présente recherche est d’abord d’essayer de comprendre 
pourquoi la Chine continue de soutenir la Corée du Nord, fournissant dons 
alimentaires et financiers. 
L’idée est donc d’analyser, selon les principes du réalisme néoclassique, la 
politique étrangère de la Chine. L’hypothèse principale de cette théorie renvoie à 
l’idée que la distribution du pouvoir dans le système international influence la 
politique étrangère des États, mais que des variables au niveau de l’état et/ou de 
l’individu interviennent dans la formulation et l’application de celle-ci. Il est 
proposé ici que le lien entre l’unipolarité du système international et la politique 
nord-coréenne de la Chine, est façonné par des variables intermédiaires telles que : 
a) la perception des leaders de la distribution du pouvoir et de leur place dans le 
système international; b) l’idéologie du régime politique, et; c) le type d’unité 
responsable de la prise de décision en politique étrangère. L’analyse de chacune 
des variables permettra de faire la lumière sur les intérêts politiques et 
économiques de la Chine dans l’entretien de cette relation avec la Corée du Nord. 
 
Mots clés: Politique étrangère, réalisme néoclassique, Chine, Corée du Nord, États-
Unis, pouvoir, arme nucléaire, idéologie, prise de décision. 
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Abstract 
Since the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) on the denuclearization of the 
Korean peninsula failed to produce any effective outcome in the 1990s, China was 
brought to the table and agreed to play its part as a mediator in the Four Party 
Talks (1997-1998) between both Koreas and the United States, as well as in the Six-
Party Talks (2003-2007), with the addition of Russia and Japan as negotiators. 
While the American policies toward the DPRK have taken a tough and inflexible 
turn with former President George W. Bush declaring, at the end of January 2002, 
that North Korea, Iran, and Iraq “constitute an axis of evil arming to threaten the 
peace of the world”, China’s DPRK policy, however, reflects long-lasting terms of 
friendship and collaboration between the two countries. With concerns mounting 
over the aggressive policies of the North Korean regime and its determination to 
keep its nuclear arsenal, the question is: why does China insist on preserving its 
good ties with its neighbour, even when those policies are said to hinder its 
political and economical interests?  
To address this question, the theoretical framework of neoclassical realism 
will be tested within a three-level – systemic, state, and individual level – analysis, 
with consideration of the propositions that the relative distribution of power 
shapes China’s North Korea policy, and intervening variables at the state and 
individual levels are filtering the systemic pressures and thus, shaping decisions 
related to North Korea. These variables include: a) leadership’s perception of 
power; b) regime type and ideology, and; c) type of foreign policy decision-making 
unit. This in-depth analysis will then provide grounds in defining China’s core 
interests in backing up the secluded regime. 
 
Key words: Foreign policy, neoclassical realism, China, Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea (DPRK), United States, distribution of power, nuclear weapons, 
ideology, decision-making 
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 CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
 
Since the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) on the denuclearization of the 
Korean peninsula failed to produce any effective outcome in the 1990s, China was 
brought to the table and agreed to play its part as a mediator in the Four Party 
Talks (1997-1998) between both Koreas and the United States, as well as in the Six-
Party Talks (2003-2007), with the addition of Russia and Japan as negotiators. 
While the American policies toward the DPRK took a tough and inflexible turn with 
former President George W. Bush declaring, at the end of January 2002, that North 
Korea, Iran, and Iraq “constitute an axis of evil arming to threaten the peace of the 
world1”, China’s DPRK policy, however, reflects long-lasting terms of friendship and 
collaboration between the two countries.  
 
It has been recognized that the need of a stable and secure environment to 
pursue its legitimizing goal of economic development, and China’s new 
responsibility, as a party to international regimes and treaties, combined to 
persuade Beijing to participate in the denuclearization talks, along with its desire to 
ease tensions and avoid any unilateral show of force by the United States against 
North Korea. But like any other party to the talks, China’s political will to negotiate 
on “common goals” is mixed with considerations of national interests. While it is 
argued that a nuclear DPRK is undermining the People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s 
global and domestic interests, official statements have stressed instead the 
importance of safeguarding peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. 
                                                        
1 “President Delivers State of Union Address”. January 2002. News and Policies. The White House – 
President George W. Bush. http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html [online] (accessed April 2011) 
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Consequently, as concerns about the DPRK’s policy have mounted since the missile 
test-fire of 1993 and more recently, with the shelling of South Korea’s Yeonpyeong 
Island in November 20102, the PRC insisted on limiting sanctions, and continued to 
provide economic, food, and energy aid to its ally. In short, there was relatively no 
disruption of ties with Kim Jong-il’s regime at the time and nothing points to a 
change in China’s stance with the new DPRK leadership under Kim Jong-un. This 
leaves us with one particular question: What are the interests of the PRC in keeping 
its good relationship with the DPRK? Or rather, why does China keep backing the 
DPRK?  
 
To make sense of these questions in terms of international relations studies, 
they had to be transposed within the subfield of foreign policy studies. However, 
while most foreign policy specialists tend to test general assumptions through 
cross-national comparisons, the purpose here is to identify particular properties of 
a single case, China, and to detect determinants of its foreign policy decisions. To 
fulfill this purpose, hypotheses had to be extracted from a theoretical approach that 
could not only clarify the rationale behind China’s stance toward North Korea, but 
could also link specific factors to the leadership’s decisions. Since it seeks to explain 
                                                        
2 The sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan, which occurred in March 2010, will not be discussed 
here, since there is still doubt about North Korea’s involvement in the incident. The People’s Republic of 
China and Russia have rejected the official report of the Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Group, 
composed of South Korean and foreign officials, which concluded that the sinking was caused by a 
torpedo sent by North Korea. For a copy of the official report see: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/20_05_10jigreport.pdf  
For more information on Russia’s response see: 
http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/article450117.ece; 
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2010/08/05/26/0301000000AEN20100805000200315F.html.  
For details on the PRC’s statement see: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2010-
06/02/content_9919715.htm; http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-06/10/content_9962812.htm.  
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the foreign policy of particular states3 by combining systemic and within-state 
variables, I was advised to look further into neoclassical realism. 
 
Neoclassical Realism, Epistemology, and Methodology 
On the whole, neoclassical realists recognize that the international system 
structures and restricts the policy choices of states4 because of constraints related 
to power distribution between them, but they stress that this link is indirect and 
complex, and can only shape their intentions. Systemic pressures, such as anarchy 
and polarity, need to be translated through elements at the domestic level in order 
to further specify state foreign policy behaviours5. These elements are identified as 
intervening variables, which consist of characteristics within states, such as, their 
political system, strategic culture, national identity, or even,  personal 
characteristics of leaders6. In other words, international system constraints and 
foreign policy are understood respectively as the independent and dependent 
variable in a cause-and-effect bond, while domestic factors represent variables that 
can alter this direct relation.  
 
 
 
                                                        
3 Liu Feng and Zhang Ruizhuang. 2006. «The Typologies of Realism». The Chinese Journal of International 
Politics: 1 (1), p.121. 
4 Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Steven E. Lobell and Norrin M. Ripsman. 2009. «Introduction: Neoclassical 
Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy». In Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, 
ed. Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.18. 
5 Gideon Rose. 1998. «Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy». World Politics: 51 (1), p.146. 
6 Anders Wivel. 2005. «Explaining Why State X Made a Certain Move Last Tuesday: the Promise and 
Limitations of Realist Foreign Policy Analysis». Journal of International Relations and Development: 8 (4), 
p.357. 
4 
 
Table 1 – Neoclassical Realism and its Related Causal Logic 
 
 
Independent 
Variable 
Intervening 
Variables 
Dependent 
Variable 
 
Relative power 
distribution 
(capabilities) 
Domestic 
characteristics Foreign policy 
Source: Taliaferro, Lobell, and Ripsman (2009), p.20. 
 
To avoid misunderstandings, an intervening variable is defined as a 
phenomenon or situation caused by the independent variable and producing the 
dependent variable. For example, in the proposition that “sunshine causes 
photosynthesis, causing grass to grow”, photosynthesis is the intervening variable7. 
If we translate this causal logic into a basic equation, one similar to that proposed 
by Stephen Van Evera in his Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, we 
would have : A  q   r   B; A, being the independent variable, B, the dependent 
variable, and q and r  the intervening variables. To test the theory properly requires 
seeking explanations related to all three steps of the causal chain, that is, the prime 
hypothesis (A  B), the theory’s explanatory hypotheses (A  q, q  r, r  B), 
and the hybrid combinations (A  r, q  B)8. In the particular case of neoclassical 
realism, it rejects the probability of single-factor explanations and accepts that the 
same intervening variable may, in different circumstances, have opposite effects. 
This flexibility reflects that, as a theoretical framework, its modest goal is to 
provide the tools for a conceptual analysis connecting variables together and 
proposing a range of variables, rather than proposing a collection of laws combined 
                                                        
7 Stephen Van Evera. 1997. Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, p.11. 
8 Ibid., p.35. 
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by government leaders and officials, as well as structured by the international 
system. Further details about the central concepts behind the neoclassical realism 
theory and their implications regarding the selected hypotheses will be discussed 
in chapter two, alongside questions related to the method of inquiry, the limits of 
this study and criticisms of the selected theory.  
 
This analysis will be based on observation and deduction to test three 
hypotheses derived from the neoclassical realist framework. It is argued here that 
China’s policy toward the DPRK is influenced by: 
• the leadership’s perception of relative power distribution (hypothesis 1) 
• the one-party ideology (hypothesis 2) 
• the type of foreign policy decision-making unit (hypothesis 3) 
To test the validity of each hypothesis, it was out of the question to carry out a 
quantitative analysis, such as game theory, which is useful for generalization of a 
large number of case studies. This is because, on the one hand, the focus of this 
study is to find whether or not the assumptions extracted from the neoclassical 
realist theory can be applied to one specific case study, China, rather than to add 
mathematical evidence and value to the theory by comparing as many states as 
possible. On the other hand, methods such as game theory all rely on the 
assumption that decisions or behaviours of either individuals or organizations are 
always rational, i.e. that they are based on predefined interests and motives. 
However, neoclassical realists reject this supposition and argue that states do not 
necessarily act in the same manner when they encounter the same constraints.  
 
In this sense, a qualitative analysis based on observations and deductions 
was conducted to test the theory, and the information gathered was divided in two 
sections. The first part of the study provides theoretical clarifications for the three 
7 
 
intervening variables. Emphasis is put on explaining why they are presented here 
as having an influence on the making of foreign policy, and a method is proposed to 
test each hypothesis. As for the second part, it consists of applying the methods to 
China’s official policy responses to issues involving North Korea over the years. 
 
 CHAPTER TWO 
Literature Review: Neoclassical Realist Theory and 
the Study of Chinese Foreign Policy 
 
Most scholars analyzing matters related to the Democratic People’s Republic 
of Korea (DPRK)’s nuclear program or to the Six-Party Talks have done so from the 
perspective of American interests (Cumings 2004; Snyder 1999; Cha 200311), with 
the purpose of discussing and elaborating on policy propositions in dealing with 
the regime. Since their work was left considerably biased by the depiction of a 
rogue, erratic, and “evil” North Korea, the motivations behind this paper was to 
keep away from this mindset and rather try to get a more relevant understanding 
of the DPRK’s system itself and its nuclear program, and highlight its relation with 
China instead of the United States. But due to the opacity of the North Korean 
regime and the lack of translated material related to foreign relations, white 
papers, government policies, bureaucracy, and so on, it was more convenient to 
reverse the subject, and focus instead on China’s policy toward the DPRK. Such an 
analysis had to take into account China’s stance regarding nuclear disarmament of 
the Korean Peninsula, and the leadership’s reactions and decisions following 
incidents related to North Korea’s military program. 
 
More specifically, this project had to fit with criteria of positivism which 
structure most of international relations studies, and therefore, the analysis had to 
rely on a certain methodological framework, a theory, that not only sought 
explanations for foreign policy of one particular state, but also considered the 
                                                        
11 See: Bruce Cumings. 2003. North Korea: Another Country. New York: New Press; Victor D. Cha and 
David C. Kang. 2003. Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies. New York: Columbia 
University Press; and Scott Snyder. 1999. Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior. 
Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press. 
9 
 
importance of domestic determinants in shaping such crucial decisions. Since it is 
agreed among most Chinese specialists that China’s foreign policy derives from 
both external and internal factors, the theory selected had to acknowledge this 
prediction. 
 
International Relations, Foreign Policy, and Realism 
At first reluctant to use realism as a frame for this study, because of its 
“outdated” notions dating back to the Cold War period, I came to realize that 
several trends had emerged from the general realist theory of international 
relations. There is, for example, Hans J. Morgenthau, Arnold Wolfers, and others’ 
classical realism, Kenneth N. Waltz and Robert Giplin’s neorealism, and Gideon 
Rose, Steven E. Lobell, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro and Randall Schweller’s neoclassical 
realism12. While all these theories emerged from realism, they were developed by 
specialists because of divergent interpretations of concepts, disagreement on 
certain assumptions, and on the level-of-analysis13. In order to justify the choice of 
neoclassical realism we should address briefly the distinctions between classical 
realism, neorealism, and neoclassical realism. 
 
                                                        
12 Taliaferro, Lobell and Ripsman, «Introduction: Neoclassical Realism...», p.4. 
13 For a thorough analysis of realist theories see: Alex Macleod. 2010. «Le réalisme néoclassique». In Alex 
Macleod and Dan O'Meara, ed. Théories des relations internationales : contestations et résistances. 
Montreal: CEPES : Athena Editions, pp.63-130; Stephen Brooks. 1997. «Dueling Realism». International 
Organization: 51 (3), pp.445-477; John A. Vasquez. 1998. The Power of Politics: From Classical Realism to 
Neotraditionalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
10 
 
From Classical to Neoclassical Realism 
The book Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy14 is a great piece 
of work offering a summary of realism as a broad approach to international 
relations studies, and as the point of origin for several theories. In general, all 
realist theories share these core assumptions: 1) international politics refers to a 
‘perpetual struggle among different states for material power and security in a 
world of scarce resources and pervasive uncertainty’15; 2) the absence of a 
universal sovereign or worldwide government, which is labelled as anarchy, is the 
permissive cause of international conflict; 3) systemic forces generate incentives 
for all states to strive for greater competence in protecting themselves16, i.e. 
ensuring their sovereignty and survival, and power is a necessary requirement to 
secure their goals17. 
 
Classical Realism 
Classical realists, such as Thomas Hobbes, Hans J. Morgenthau or Henry 
Kissinger, considered the individual as the unit of analysis and were concerned 
primarily with the sources and uses of national power in international politics and 
the problems that leaders encounter in conducting foreign policy18. The Prince, by 
Niccolò Machiavelli, for example, was designed as a handbook on politics for Italian 
princes, and basically conveyed that a statesman’s wisdom and decisions will lead 
to either the state’s success or demise. In fact, classical realists write extensively 
about the state and national power, but little is said about the constraints of the 
                                                        
14 Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, ed. 2009. Neoclassical Realism, the 
State, and Foreign Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
15 Taliaferro, Lobell and Ripsman, «Introduction: Neoclassical Realism...», p.4. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., p.16. 
18 For a better understanding for classical realism see: Niccolò Machiavelli. 1952. The Prince (or reprints with 
discussions from editors and political theorists); Hans J. Morgenthau. 1973. Politics among nations; 
Michael Joseph Smith. 1986. Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger; and Jack Donnelly. 2000. Realism 
and International Relations. 
11 
 
international system19. What stimulated other realists to improve the theory was 
two-fold. Failure to provide a precise definition of “power” or “balance of power” 
on the one hand, and non-adherence to standards of social and political science 
methodology, on the other20. Realist scholars such as Morton Kaplan (1957) and 
Stanley Hoffman (1959, 1965), abandoned the analysis of human nature to explain 
conflict and cooperation, and instead focused their attention on the anarchic nature 
of the international system21. Their work progressed into what would be called 
neorealism or structural realism. 
 
Neorealism 
Because it focuses on the international system and its structural restrictions 
on the behaviour of states, neorealism is a system-centric theory22. Neorealists 
principally address questions related to international politics, such as: Why do 
wars occur? Why do states tend to balance against powerful states? And they try to 
respond in a scientific manner, in line with the positivist methodology23, which 
consists of theorizing a general phenomena or situation with causal laws and 
hypotheses composed of dependent and independent variables. Kenneth Waltz can 
be considered one of the major contributors to this realist subdivision, with his 
work on the three images –the man, the state, and the system – to explain the 
causes of war, and the theory of balance of power. In Waltz’s balance of power 
theory, states are unitary actors that seek, at a minimum, to preserve themselves 
                                                        
19 Taliaferro, Lobell and Ripsman, «Introduction: Neoclassical Realism...», p. 16.  
20 Ibid., p.16. 
21 Robert O. Keohane. 1986. Neorealism and its Critics. New York: Columbia University Press, p.13. 
22 Liu Feng and Zhang Ruizhuang, «The Typologies of Realism», p.112. 
23 Taliaferro, Lobell and Ripsman, «Introduction: Neoclassical Realism...», p.17. 
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and, at a maximum, to dominate others, because of the “self-help” international 
system which doesn’t provide a superior government to regulate their actions24. 
 
Although other neorealists do not necessarily adhere to Waltz’s 
conceptualization of the balancing process, none contest the proposition that, all 
states are rational, unitary actors25. Rationality is to realists, the idea that states act 
in conformity to their national interests and with the purpose of maximizing their 
benefits and minimizing their losses. And the assumption that states are unitary 
actors implies that, all states despite variations essentially fulfill the same functions 
and seek more or less the same ends. Whatever their form, ideology, peacefulness, 
and so on, states are alike and can be treated as having the same attributes26. In 
other words, none of the structural realist perspectives (offensive realism, utility 
theory, etc.) consider that states may differ in their ability to control the policy 
agenda, select policy options, or mobilize resources to respond to systemic 
incentives27.  
 
Eventually, criticism was brought upon the fact that, while neorealists 
frequently commented on foreign policy, they could not explain why states behave 
differently when subject to the same structural pressure. Recognizing the 
limitations of the system-centric theory, other realist scholars have sought to 
analyze not the outcomes related to the international system environment, but the 
foreign policy behaviour of states. This effort developed into a recent branch of 
political realism, neoclassical realism. 
                                                        
24 James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff. 2001. Contending Theories of International Relations : A 
Comprehensive Survey. 5th ed. New York, Montreal: Longman, p.44. 
25 Wivel, «Explaining Why State X...», p.363. 
26 Terry Terriff. 1999. Security Studies Today. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, p.35. 
27 Taliaferro, Lobell and Ripsman, «Introduction: Neoclassical Realism...», p.19. 
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Neoclassical Realism 
As a theory of foreign policy, neoclassical realism seeks explanations 
regarding the variation in foreign policy behaviour of a particular state over time, 
or cross-national variations when states are facing similar external outcomes28, 
unlike neorealists who emphasize the international structure to explain general 
international outcomes. Proponents of neoclassical realism recognize the 
importance of key concepts of realism, but interpret them differently. They regard 
states as the central actors in global politics, but their assessment is that of a state 
organized under an executive composed by government elite, ministers, and 
officials charged with making foreign security policy, that has access to privileged 
information from the state’s politico-military apparatus, and is best equipped to 
perceive systemic pressures and sketch national interests29. They picture the 
international system as a distribution of power capabilities between states, but 
they argue that the link between power and policy is indirect, and must be 
translated through domestic characteristics 30  that may intervene in the 
specification of policy options31. Therefore, neoclassical realists stress the need to 
examine the contexts in which foreign policies are formulated and implemented32, 
which also implies that foreign policy is understood as a decision making process. 
 
The most important domestic factor highlighted by neoclassical realists is 
the leadership’s perception of power distribution. From their point of view, the 
executive’s capacity to abide by its preferences and objectives vis-à-vis other states 
is believed to stem largely from its evaluation and perception of the power 
                                                        
28 Ibid., p.21. 
29 Ibid., p.25. 
30 Rose, «Neoclassical Realism...», p.146. 
31 Macleod, «Le réalisme néoclassique», p.130. 
32 Rose, «Neoclassical Realism...», p.146. 
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distribution33. Depending on one’s perception of its material power, an event might 
be perceived either as a threat or an opportunity. Other factors have been studied, 
such as domestic politics, where elite consensus or disagreement about the nature 
and extent of international threats, persistent international divisions within the 
leadership, social cohesion and the regime’s vulnerability to overthrow, all can 
inhibit the state’s ability to respond to systemic pressures34. The role of the 
extractive and mobilizational capacities of the leadership itself or of politico-
military institutions has also been emphasized.35 As both capacities are not simply 
functions of a state’s bureaucracy or of the composition of a regime’s power 
institutions, but can derive from ideational factors such as ideology and 
nationalism36, ideological predispositions or socialization experiences may also 
influence the leadership’s preferences as to where and how resources are to be 
utilized37. 
 
Chinese Foreign Policy and Neoclassical Realism 
So far, very few Chinese foreign policy analysts have formally acknowledged 
the theory of neoclassical realism, and very few neoclassical realists have 
investigated specifically the case of China, which is why this project bears a fair 
degree of deduction. Nevertheless, Chinese specialists have more than once 
indicated that a fair assessment of the state’s foreign policy should regard both 
                                                        
33 Macleod, «Le réalisme néoclassique», p.130. 
34 See: Randall L. Schweller. 2006. Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power. 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University. 
35 Taliaferro, Lobell and Ripsman, «Introduction: Neoclassical Realism...», p.4. 
36 Ibid., p.38. 
37 Maurice A. East. 1978. «National Attributes and Foreign Policy». In Maurice A. East, Stephen A. 
Salmore and Charles F. Hermann, ed. Why Nations Act : Theoretical Perspectives for Comparative Foreign 
Policy Studies. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, p.105. 
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external and domestic determinants38. For example, in a review of various 
approaches to the study of Chinese foreign relations, Samuel S. Kim put forward 
that: 
With the growing interaction between internal and external 
functions and an increasing associated interaction between security and 
economic policies, the factors that influence Chinese foreign policy 
behaviour no longer fall neatly into the dichotomous categories of 
domestic/societal and external/systemic variables. Both sets of variables 
involve structural as well as cognitive elements, and they interact during 
the decision-making process. […] [A]n increasingly complex and 
interdependent world domestic and foreign policies and objectives are 
interwoven in terms of cause and effect, constituting mutually essential 
parts of any theoretical approach39. 
 
Advocates of this domestic/external-linkage approach recognize that the global 
system, with its various constraints or opportunities, cannot have any significant 
influence on Chinese foreign policy unless it is perceived by Chinese policy makers 
through their own decision-making system, but they disagree on which factors 
matter the most in determining foreign policy40.  
 
To be clear, foreign policy, like domestic policy, is understood here as a 
decision making process, not simply an act of choice. Such an approach on foreign 
policy is not new and many scholars of various backgrounds developed their own 
theory from the perspective of decision-making. Some enhanced the rational choice 
approach (Allison, 1971; Simon, 1976), which bases assumptions on human 
                                                        
38 For example, see: Chen Jian. China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Korean War (1994); 
Zhao Quansheng. «Domestic Factors of Chinese Foreign Policy: From Vertical to Horizontal 
Authoritarianism» (1992), Interpreting Chinese Policy (1996); Liu Guoli. ed. Chinese Foreign Policy in 
Transition (2004); Boris T. Kulik. «National Security Policy-Making by the CCP: The Role of Domestic 
Factors» in Satu P. Limaye and Yashuhiro Matsuda. ed. Domestic Determinants and Security Policy-
Making in East Asia (2000). 
39 Samuel S. Kim. 1994. «China and the World in Theory and Practice». In Samuel S. Kim, ed. China and 
the World : Chinese Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, p.29-30. 
40 Ibid., p.30. 
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motives and behaviours, and deduce logical institutional and policy propositions 
from those assumptions. From this perspective, decision-making alternatives are 
selected because they maximize a policy outcome41 and can be predicted with game 
tests and mathematical formulas. As it was said earlier, however, this approach is 
based on the assumption that any state will act similarly when pressured by the 
same constraints, regardless of different domestic attributes. 
 
Allison (1971) and others (Halperin, 1974; Neustadt, 1960) also aimed their 
attention at bureaucratic politics, which defines policy process and decisions as the 
result of a political competition among bureaucratic entities and actors pressured 
by their organizational roles and capacities42. According to this view, policy 
decisions emerge from bargaining, negotiation, and struggle among the 
bureaucrats involved. However, with regard to the Chinese context, bureaucratic 
infighting is usually muted, since the Party’s and the government’s bureaucracies 
are untangled with each other, meaning that responsibilities and loyalties are 
overlapping. Because of his own multiple bureaucratic affiliations, one official 
would be fighting for the interests of different and even competing bureaucratic 
units43. 
 
With the recent case of Bo Xilai; ex-member of China’s ruling body, the 
Politburo, who was demoted for reasons still unclear, but converging around his 
possible attempt to gain a seat in the Politburo Standing Committee at the eve of a 
political succession, mixed with his alleged praising of the Cultural Revolution, and 
                                                        
41 Chen Feng. 1995. Economic Transition and Political Legitimacy in Post-Mao China : Ideology and 
Reform. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, p.6. 
42 Ibid., p.8. 
43 Michael Ng-Quinn. 2004. «The Analytical Study of Chinese Foreign Policy». In Liu Guoli, ed. Chinese 
Foreign Policy in Transition. New York: Transaction Publishers, p.36-37. 
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divergent style of rule in Chongqing44, it is hard to say if this is a rare account of 
political factionalism in China or if it usually does not reach public ears. Another 
inconvenience of this bureaucratic approach is that it has difficulty explaining why 
policy orientations might change even though the bureaucratic positions of the 
personnel remained unchanged45. 
 
However limited, a decision-making approach offers a view of politics as a 
problem-solving process, by which individuals, groups, or organizations choose 
among alternative courses of action (or inaction) designated to solve a particular 
problem on the international arena46. More specifically, when the unit responsible 
for decision making perceives a situation or event which is deviating from an ideal 
or expected status, decision problems arise and the process to resolve them begins. 
According to the kind of pressure they exert, situation-related stimuli for decision 
may be perceived as opportunities, problems, or crises, suggesting that motivation 
behind a decision involve shifting perceptions of the environment by the decision-
makers due to events or situations that evolve in the “real world”47. As Mintz and 
DeRouen expressed in their guide to understand foreign policy decision making: 
The course of world politics is shaped by leaders’ decisions. The 
uncertainty involved in foreign policy making can pertain, for example, to 
an opponent’s motives, beliefs, intentions, or calculations. If we can 
understand how decisions are made, we can better understand and, 
perhaps more important, predict outcomes in the international arena48. 
 
                                                        
44 «The Sacking of Bo Xilai». March 17, 2012. The Economist. Online. 
http://www.economist.com/node/21550309 (page accessed April 4 2012). 
45 Chen Feng, Economic Transition and Political Legitimacy..., p.8. 
46 Zeev Maoz. 1990. National Choices and International Processes. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, p.38. 
47 Ibid., p.39. 
48 Alex Mintz and Karl R. DeRouen. 2010. Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, p.3. 
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Zeev Maoz (1990), a professor of political science and Head of the Jaffee Center for 
Strategic Studies at Tel-Aviv University, made several contributions to the 
development of this approach while studying matters related to international 
conflict, decision making, and international bargaining. As he explains it, the 
process of making a decision entails a dynamic of six phases, before implementing a 
certain policy:  
1) Diagnosis, which consists of identifying the problem and classifying it as 
an instance for decision; 2) Search, the exploration of policy options and 
determination of the array of outcomes associated with each of the identified 
options; 3) Revision, where the data collected is synthesized for estimation of 
probabilities associated with each outcome, and the likelihood estimates in light of 
incoming information are updated; 4) Evaluation, to identify goals or values 
affected by the decision problem and the cost-benefit analysis of options on these 
goals. This is when decision makers determine preferences for options on the basis 
of the degree to which each option is seen to mitigate or alleviate those goals; 5) 
Choice, which consists of selecting an option for response to the problem. This 
phase rests on certain criteria that define the ways in which preferences are 
ordered, as well as a degree of commitment to a certain policy option, and; 
6)Implementation, when the decision is converted to observable action49.  
 
Integrating such a dynamic to the framework of neoclassical realism makes 
it easier to picture when domestic variables might come into play during the 
process of policy making. Furthermore, while neoclassical realism provides the 
canvas of core concepts and propositions to seek explanations for a state’s foreign 
policy, it does not impose the variables to consider, or the methods to be used to 
investigate a case study. Therefore, to address the following hypotheses: 1) China’s 
DPRK policy is influenced by the leadership’s perception of power; 2) China’s DPRK 
                                                        
49 Maoz, National Choices..., p.39-40. 
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policy is shaped by the one-party ideology, and; 3) China’s DPRK policy is affected 
by the organization of Chinese foreign policy decision-making, a combination of 
several methods of inquiry is necessary. In the end, this study will serve more as a 
way to test the neoclassical realist theory and the predictions extracted from it, by 
proposing a method to observe each intervening variable and applying these to the 
context of actual policy decisions from China. 
 
 CHAPTER THREE 
Methodology 
Hypothesis 1 – Perceptions of Power and China’s DPRK Policy 
Here, what is assumed is that the relative distribution of power perceived by 
the leadership reflects national attributes, such as the state’s level of economic 
development, educational level of its population, its level of technology, in 
comparison to other states, all of which can affect the leaders’ predispositions as to 
where and how resources are to be utilized in the process of foreign policy decision 
making50. A great number of Chinese studies experts have looked into what is 
commonly called “China’s rise” and China’s quest for power, from the perspective of 
neorealism, arguing that the state’s policies are directed at balancing the United 
States. The purpose here, however, is to highlight how the Chinese leadership 
perceives their country’s status, and if it has an impact on the formulation and 
implementation of foreign policies. To investigate hypothesis 1, the method used is 
inspired by William C. Wohlforth’s work on balance-of-power51, which consists of 
collecting evidence on the leadership’s perceptions of: what constitutes power, how 
is power distributed in the international system, the prestige it translates, and 
mechanisms of power. 
 
Such evidence can be found in available archival material such as the 
People’s Republic of China and the Communist Party of China’s Constitutions, White 
papers, statements made by the PRC’s Ministry of National Defense, communiqués 
related to the DPRK, as well as in monographs and articles on China’s foreign and 
security policies and international relations (Chen, 1993; Chung, 2009; Huo, 1992; 
                                                        
50 Barbara G. Salmore and Stephen A. Salmore. 1978. «Political Regimes and Foreign Policy». In Maurice 
A. East, Stephen A. Salmore and Charles F. Hermann, ed. Why Nations Act: Theoretical Perspectives for 
Comparative Foreign Policy Studies. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, p.105. 
51 William C. Wohlforth. 1993. The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions During the Cold War. Ithaca: 
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etc.). Memoirs or testimonies of actors participating in the foreign and security 
policy decision-making process or with the fostering of relations with the DPRK, for 
example, can be of particularly great value. Considering my illiteracy in the Chinese 
language, this study is however limited to documents translated online or on paper. 
 
Hypothesis 2 – Ideology and China’s DPRK Policy 
Since capitalist-type economic reforms have been introduced into China’s 
socialist system, the prioritization of ideology has declined and so has the interest 
of scholars in studying its role in today’s China. Accordingly, we can find only a 
handful of recent references exploring the relation between ideology and foreign 
policy, in China and in general. The majority of documents dates back to the 1960s 
and 1970s, and so they lack relevance when observing post-Mao and post-Cold War 
China. With the combination of Schurmann (1968), Chen (1995), and others’ work, 
we came to share the insight that China’s political system is still an ideological one 
and that policies are still justified by the Party in ideological terms52. To clarify the 
role of ideology in the Chinese DPRK policy, emphasis will be put on a comparison 
of the principal values and goals embedded in the Communist party’s values and 
principles, and the interests behind the leadership’s DPRK policy. 
 
If a significant correlation is observed, then we can assume that for this case, 
ideology is a factor intervening in the process of foreign policy making. Such a 
comparison will rely on sources useful to grasp the CCP ideology, such as the Party 
and the state’s constitutions, speeches and statements made at Party Congresses or 
scholar contributions (Levine, 1994; Chen, 1995; Kulik, 2000) on the one hand, and 
official statements related to “crisis” or conflict management on the Korean 
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peninsula, articles and books studying China’s DPRK policy, on the other (Garrett, 
1995; Liu, 2003; Shambaugh, 2003; Shen, 2006, 2009; Zhang, 2006). 
 
Hypothesis 3 – Foreign policy decision unit and China’s DPRK Policy 
Relying for the most part on the decision units approach developed by 
Charles and Margaret Hermann and their colleagues53, this third portion of the 
analysis will focus on the proposition that the type of actors who have the authority 
to make foreign policy decisions within any governments or ruling parties around 
the world, whether it is an individual or a set of individuals, can affect the nature of 
those decisions. The framework was developed to facilitate the work of scholars 
examining how decisions are made in all types of countries, and by using it here we 
will try to verify the impact of the decision unit on China’s policy toward the DPRK.  
 
In order to do so, we need to be familiar with who is responsible of foreign 
policy making in China (Dittmer, 2001; Ning, 2001; Cabestan, 2009; Sutter, 2010; 
etc.), by seeking answers to questions like: Which organs are responsible for 
foreign policy? Who constitute the staff? Who is in charge? And since the type of 
decision unit can change depending on the type of issue, it will be necessary to 
discern if a different decision unit was responsible for decisions related to the 
DPRK. From then, the framework will be applied to compare the process outcome 
suggested with the real response. 
 
The study will develop in two parts. In the first, each intervening variables 
will be defined more thoroughly one by one, and put in the context of Chinese 
                                                        
53 See: C. Hermann, M. Hermann and Hagan, 1987; M. Hermann, 2001, and the special issue of the 
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foreign policy making. Then, section two will focus on three specific events 
involving North Korea, beginning with the second nuclear crisis and the initiation 
of the Six-Party Talks in 2003, the missiles and nuclear tests of 2006, and the 
shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010. Each issue being of a different nature; one 
touching on the concern of proliferation, the other referring to missile and nuclear 
weaponry testing, and the last, on a material conflict between the two Koreas, it is 
believed that it will offer better ground to test the proposed correlations, and 
question the validity of the theory. For each incident, the implication of perceptions 
of power, ideology, and foreign policy decision-making unit will be addressed with 
their respective method of inquiry, parallel to the official response of the Chinese 
leadership in dealing with the problem. Before accessing the core of this project, 
let’s consider some concerns related to the theory of neoclassical realism. 
 
Critics of Neoclassical Realism and Limits of this Study 
Here are some other elements of neoclassical realism theory that have been 
criticized both, by proponents of the theory and outsiders. First, because 
neoclassical realists seek to clarify why the foreign policies of particular states have 
changed over time or why states facing similar external constraints opted for 
different strategies, they do not concern themselves with explaining general 
patterns of systemic outcomes. Thus, they cannot explain the systemic 
consequences of those responses54. Second, neoclassical studies seek to extract 
clarifications from a particular process or outcome (the foreign policy of a state). In 
this sense, the variables become context-specific55 , which compromise the 
possibility of generalization and the predictive power of the theory As Anders 
Wivel (2005) noted, “relying solely on structural factors leaves us with highly 
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indeterminate predictions about foreign policy behaviour, but adding variables ad 
hoc based on single case or very few selected case studies seems equally 
problematic56.” In response to the second remark, one of the contributors to the 
development of the theory, Randall Schweller, stressed that neoclassical realism 
was a useful approach for understanding foreign policy in general, because the 
identification of domestic political variables allows us to explain not only why 
states occasionally fail to balance against hostile powers, but also why they opt for 
particular balancing strategies from a variety of acceptable alternatives – alliance 
versus rearmament, for example – and the timing and style of their foreign policy57. 
 
On the other hand, we can say that neoclassical realism is a work in 
progress, and that like any other variants of realism, improvements will be possible 
only by testing its hypotheses on a various range of case studies, either to refute or 
verify them. In its defense, we ought to agree with the fact that the theory is ‘well-
positioned’ to perform what policy-relevant theories should do: conceptualize 
foreign policy strategies, whether successful or inconclusive ones, by transparently 
identifying the key variables associated with their outcome, and explaining the 
logic underlying their operation58. In their conclusion, the editors of Neoclassical 
Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy also underline some flaws behind the theory 
and proposed avenues for future research but on the whole, they believe that 
neoclassical realism provides a rich understanding of what determines foreign 
policy and how states respond to international challenges59. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Domestic Determinants of Chinese Foreign Policy 
 
The core assumption of neoclassical realism is that a state’s relative power 
vis-à-vis all other states of the international system, is a dominant factor shaping 
patterns of its foreign policy. Therefore, this is where an analysis of foreign policy 
should begin60. But as mentioned earlier, neoclassical realists, unlike structural 
realists, find that this relative distribution of power only frames policy choices and 
intentions of states61, while their actions are instead determined by domestic 
characteristics62. Applying this assessment to the case of Chinese foreign policy, the 
present study supposes that perceptions of decision makers, ideology, and 
decision-making structure have a certain impact on decision-making, as these 
variables filter the weight of power distribution on policy. We shall examine each 
variable in turn with an outlook on general understandings and specific 
considerations for China’s foreign policy. 
 
Power, Perception, and Policy 
Starting with hypothesis 1, it is argued that the independent variable, 
relative power distribution, is perceived by states’ leaders, and that this perception 
has an impact on the link between power and policy. A study of perceptions is 
deemed necessary if we make the two following assumptions: The international 
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environment may influence the general outline of the state’s policy but not its 
specific responses; and individuals, who constitute the state’s executive, behave 
differently under similar constraints63. But what exactly is power and how is it 
related to perception?  
 
State Power and Capabilities 
Power is defined by neoclassical realists as capabilities, or resources, with 
which states can influence each other. States compare each other’s attributes and 
performance, and while doing so, they can not only redefine their preferences and 
goals with respect to foreign policy, but also measure up the range of possible 
actions64. This stems from the fact that the leadership needs to mobilize national 
attributes to implement external policies such as diplomacy, coercion, or 
cooperation, etc. But it is the leadership’s capacity, ability, or predisposition to use 
those capabilities that determine policy choices. What is important to grasp, 
however, is that national resources do not refer solely to military strength, because 
political, socio-cultural, economic, and geographical attributes can also constitute 
the power of a state65.  
 
In effect, reference to the concept of power throughout this study will 
always bear in mind that elements of power include population, political and 
economical development, resources, individual leadership, the quality of 
government, the competence of its administrators, and a government’s reputation 
in world politics, among other things. For neoclassical realists, the distribution of 
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such power capabilities between all states in the international system drives the 
scope and ambition of a state’s foreign policy. The predominance of the United 
States in terms of power concentration is still widely recognized in 2012, which 
attests the unipolarity of the international system. The purpose of this project is to 
find what Chinese leaders actually think about power and unipolarity in general 
and how it affects their choice of policy with regard to North Korea. 
 
Power and Perception 
For neoclassical realists, power is a concept that depends on the evaluation 
or perception by a state’s leadership of its capacity to realize its preferences and 
objectives vis-à-vis other states66. In his analysis of diplomacy, Adam Watson 
(1991) summarized perfectly this assessment in a meaningful sentence: “What a 
state’s neighbours perceive to be its power takes into account such things as the 
numbers and skills of its population, the extent, resources and strategic location of 
its territory, its wealth and productive capacity including the sources from which it 
derives its wealth and productive capacity including the sources from which it 
derives its wealth and how far it controls them, its internal organization, public 
attitudes and the competence of its government, its existing and potential military 
capacity, and other more intangible but essential factors like its international aims 
and the degree of its determination to achieve them67”. 
 
Not only is the leadership’s perception of its own national power important, 
but also its perception of other states’ power. In agreement with Wohlforth (1993) 
we argue that power-centered analytical frameworks will be improved by 
accumulating knowledge about how political elites actually perceive power in 
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various time and place. If power affects the course of international politics, it ought 
to do so through the perceptions of the people who make the decisions on behalf of 
states68. Mark Mancall, a Chinese studies expert who specialized in Sino-Russian 
relations, once mentioned that policy was made and executed by people who define 
the world and themselves in consonance with the world view within which they 
lead their daily lives. “The intellectual assumptions, emotional predispositions, 
cognitive maps, and perceptual structures of the foreign policy-makers are all 
rooted in the prevailing world view of his […] society69”. In the same fashion as 
Wohlforth’s work on balance-of-power, our assessment of Chinese leaders’ 
perception of power will focus on: a) the elements of power; b) the distribution of 
power; c) mechanics of power, and; d) prestige70. As described by the author; 
a) The elements of power refer to questions such as, “what do people think 
power is? What elements constitute national power? What resources matter?”. 
Therefore, judgements about the elements of power should reflect judgements 
about other aspects of world politics71.  
b) Distribution of power relates to : how does one’s country rank against the 
other great powers? Which states are great powers? Did observers perceive 
unipolarity, bipolarity, etc.? How did they see changes in the distribution of power? 
c) Mechanics of power correspond to a certain policy choice, such as 
balance-of-power, cooperation, or any other way that a state responds to external 
threats, and how it is working in the real world.  
d) As for prestige, we need to look for the leadership’s interpretation of 
“Who has the most diplomatic weight? Who has the greatest influence over global 
politics? What is the relation between power and prestige? Which capabilities 
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translate into prestige? Will an increase in power lead to greater weight in 
diplomatic councils72?” It was mentioned earlier that prestige and reputation were 
parts of political capabilities. As Wohlforth sees it, statesmen are attentive to the 
way others perceive their power and prestige because a favourable impression 
abroad will increase the likelihood of successful diplomacy73. 
 
Perception of Power and Chinese Foreign Policy 
With the application of Wohlforth’s method to the Chinese case, we have to 
be particularly careful with the information that will be extracted from archival and 
open sources, such as White Papers, statements or speeches. The fact that the state 
is built on the rule of the Chinese Communist Party means that there is a party line 
on most matters which certainly provides the most important context for all 
political communication74. Perusal of the Chinese press, not to mention its 
translation, only reveals publicly articulated Chinese rationales under specific 
circumstances75. Also, when dealing with public political sources, we should always 
question the validity of the text in representing belief, or ask if action can be based 
on belief. 
 
It is imperative to address one particular question during each text’s 
examination: Is the view expressed in the text a deliberate attempt to mislead the 
reader? Statements can be part of a broad pattern of censorship or propaganda and 
therefore, it would be wise to consult as wide an array of sources as possible to 
control for propaganda targeted at specific audiences, and seek to position each 
text in its historical and political context. Only then can the analyst give an answer 
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when asking if the author of the text in question has an interest in manipulation. 
Throughout the analysis of these sources, it is important to inspect for example, 
whether there was a general party line at the time, an image that the leadership 
was trying to convey, what was or is the foreign and domestic conjuncture, or to 
whom the leadership may wish to communicate76. 
 
To seek explanations regarding China’s DPRK policy since the outbreak of 
the second nuclear crisis between the United States and the DPRK in 2002, we need 
to bear in mind the context of the post-Cold War period and, as stated above, the 
unipolarity of the international system. The post-Cold War period bears particular 
significance for the Chinese because the collapse of the Soviet Union reminded 
them of the changes in Eastern Europe in 1989 and the decline of communist 
ideology. In addition, in the eyes of the Chinese, the United States has harboured 
the hegemonic ambition of dominating the world ever since the end of World War 
II, but was unable to fulfill its aspirations because of the enormous challenge from 
the Soviet Union. The collapse of bipolarity has strengthened America’s volition to 
play a leading role in world politics77. 
 
According to Chinese sources, American leaders made a strategic decision to 
shape the structure of the post-Cold War international system, as they were 
reluctant to accept the multipolar trend in world politics. More specifically, 
Washington was determined to establish a US-dominated unipolar world structure 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Two major developments in world politics in the 
immediate post-Cold War era are believed to have had a significant impact on 
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American strategic thinking. The first was the revolution in Eastern Europe in 
1989, which was followed by the break-up of the Soviet Union two years later. To 
the Americans, the collapse of the regimes in the communist bloc represented a 
Western triumph in the ideological struggle between capitalism and communism 
which had lasted for over 40 years. It demonstrated the bankruptcy of the 
communist system and the strength of capitalist values. In this sense, the US 
claimed that it had won the Cold War. As Russia was no longer in a position to 
engage in global rivalry with the United States, it became the sole superpower in 
the international system78.  
 
The second event that encouraged Washington to build a unipolar world 
structure was the American victory in the Gulf War in 1991. The Gulf crisis 
provided the United States with an excellent opportunity to prove its military 
superiority and capability of leading the world. Chinese analysts pointed out that 
the Americans believed the rapid defeat of Saddam Hussein indicated 
unambiguously that the US was the only country that had the political, economic 
and military strength to lead the entire world. This, is only a glance of what may be 
the Chinese leadership’s assessment of the international environment in terms of 
relative power distribution. In order to test the prediction that the leadership’s 
perception of: a) the elements of power; b) the distribution of power; c) mechanics 
of power, and; d) prestige, shapes China’s policy options with respect to North 
Korea and the problem of denuclearization, three incidents, from 2002 to 2010, will 
be explored to trace China’s response and China’s perception of power during each 
period of time. Before that, we shall consider the other variables that are believed 
to intervene in the process of decision making.  
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Ideology and Foreign Policy 
Incorporating ideas into the realm of foreign policy studies is more common 
for constructivists than for realists, but when pointing out the role of domestic 
factors on foreign policy decision making, neoclassical realists cannot discard the 
possibility that a political ideology may turn out to be such a factor. In an article on 
grand strategy, Nicholas Kitchen (2010) commented on the neoclassical realist 
theory and its consideration of ideas as intervening in the process of foreign policy. 
Kitchen pointed out three locations where ideas may surface: through the 
individuals that hold them, through institutions in which they may become 
embedded, and through the broader context of state culture79. In terms of foreign 
policy, neoclassical realists recognize that at the individual level, ideas held by 
states’ decision makers and their advisors are most likely to have an influence on 
policy. Moreover, when individuals with shared ideas join together groups, 
organizations, and institutions that operate in either formal and informal sectors of 
a state’s policy-making process, those ideas are bound to impinge upon decisions80.  
 
With respect to the neoclassical realist theory and the present case study, 
we will focus on the dynamic between the power distribution, ideology, and 
Chinese foreign policy. What is the role of ideology in foreign policy? Is there a link 
between ideology and the previous intervening variable, perception of power? 
Concerned by the relevance of an approach focusing on ideology to analyze policy 
making, assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at Upsala College, 
Chen Feng (1995), stated that ideas would have no explanatory power if we don’t 
know how a particular set of ideas penetrates into the policy thinking of decision 
makers, how ideas define and redefine the problems to be solved, and how ideas 
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make differences in the policy process81. In order to present the explanatory 
capacity of ideology with respect to Chinese foreign policy, we should first clarify 
what exactly is ideology.  
 
Ideology and Politics 
In political science jargon, ideologies can be defined as idea-networks 
containing beliefs – including consciously or unconsciously held values, 
understandings, interpretations, myths, and preferences – which support or 
contest political arrangements and processes, while at the same time, providing 
plans of action for public political institutions; and in doing so, acting as devices for 
mobilizing mass political activity82. Michael Freeden (1996), a scholar known for 
his work on ideology stressed that despite micro-functions on the individual level, 
ideologies are primarily linked to central political structures, seen as both the 
objects and the disseminators of ideological activity83. Keeping this in mind, and 
adding the fact that our case study, China, is a highly-centralized, Leninist one-party 
system, we will not address the question of why or to what extent, ideology is 
absorbed by the individual to find evidence of the link between ideology and 
foreign policy making. Such matters should be addressed properly within the scope 
of psychological studies. Though we mention briefly that ideology can shape 
perceptions, which relates to the individual level, we are more interested in finding 
if China’s political ideology as a whole might restrain policy options of foreign 
policy decision makers. 
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A regime’s total ideology consists of pure and practical ideology, or as Chen 
(1994) puts it, fundamental and instrumental principles. Pure ideology is the core 
of an ideology and refers to a set of ideas or theories, designed to mould the 
thinking of the individual84 into a unified and conscious world view85. Pure 
ideology stands on fundamental principles which set the tone and parameters of 
political life in society and epitomize “fixed” elements, which are dogmatic and 
impermeable to argument and evidence. These principles justify the ultimate goals 
by which the regime claims legitimacy86. For Chinese leaders and citizens who 
entered the membership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), for example, 
Marxism-Leninism is the theoretical foundation of the Chinese communist ideology 
which guides both the Party and the state87. However, while Marxism-Leninism is a 
pure ideology that may be shared by all Communist parties, the principles and 
methods of practice, i.e., practical ideology, are specific to the CCP88. In other words, 
Communist ideology, like other ideologies, is not monolithic and can be divided into 
two dimensions, one referring to the core values of ideology and the other to its 
practical application89. 
 
Unlike pure ideology, “practical ideology” is a set of ideas designed to give 
the individual rational instruments for action90. More specifically, the principles of 
practical ideology, which we refer to as “instrumental principles”, state norms, i.e., 
rules which prescribe behaviour and thus are expected to set options for action91. 
They function to interpret the nature of current tasks that confront the leadership 
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and to justify current policies, thus indicating how political actors perceive, 
diagnose, prescribe, and make choices in specific problem areas92. Instrumental 
principles deal with immediate goals and serves to legitimate the leadership by 
stressing “performance”93. According to James C. F. Wang, professor of Political 
Science and International Studies at the University of Hawaii, practical ideology is 
based on experiences and practices94, which would mean that it can evolve and 
change over time. 
 
Chen (1994) explains that these instrumental principles can be grouped into 
three types, in terms of their construction or their relationship to fundamental 
principles: 1) dogmatic principles, which are directly derived from, and serve to 
actualize, fundamental principles; 2) pragmatic principles, simply grounded on 
practical needs but which can be loosely linked to fundamental principles; 
therefore they represent new interpretations of fundamental principles and serve 
to fill the gap between ideology and reality, and; 3) divergent principles, coming 
from another ideological source but which are defined in the terms of the existing 
ideology95. Although all instrumental principles serve to identify problems and 
prescribe recommendations for problem solving, the different types of 
instrumental principles identify the problems to be solved differently, and 
consequently, offer different policy recommendations.  
 
In the case of communist politics, the dogmatic type of instrumental 
principles is related to revolutionary orientations and policies that stick to 
ideological orthodoxy, whereas the pragmatic type portrays moderate and less 
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ideologically inspired problem-solving orientations. Finally, the divergent type 
indicates the decline of the existing ideology and its failure to address the problems 
to be solved96. In China, the operation of the three types of instrumental principles 
basically corresponds to the phases of political development. Dogmatic principles 
mainly reflect the orientation of the pre-reform years, when ideology penetrated 
every aspect of life in society. The pragmatic type had been widely used by Chinese 
leadership in most of the reform period, and the divergent type emerged in the late 
1980s, when the reform was demanding daring policies beyond the existing 
economic ideological framework97. The fact that the leadership chooses different 
type of instrumental principles to deal with issues and formulate policies is a sign 
of a reconsideration of core beliefs that might occur because of a need to adapt to a 
new international environment, a change in perception of the international 
environment, or a redefinition of national needs and interests. 
 
Ideology as a Determinant of Perception 
Our first variable, which we suggest can intervene in the process of foreign 
policy decision making, was perception of the power distribution between states. 
Without going too deep in considerations of the individual, we found that the 
second variable, ideology, could not only be linked to foreign policy, but also, to 
perception. As Steven I. Levine (1994), research faculty associate in the 
Department of History at the University of Montana and Harvard graduate, 
explained in a chapter on perception and ideology in Chinese foreign policy, 
decision-makers everywhere bring to their struggles with the complexities of 
foreign affairs sets of presuppositions, values, expectations, preferences, and 
operating assumptions that materialize through three different sources. Ideas or 
principles like those constructing an ideology are assimilated, 1) through a process 
                                                        
96 Ibid., p.15. 
97 Ibid. 
37 
 
of socialization into a specific culture at a particular period of time; 2) through their 
unique experiences as individuals and their shared experiences as members of 
groups, and finally; 3) through their conscious choices as thinking political actors 
from the menu of values, systems of thought, and so forth that are available to 
them98.  
 
More specifically, ideology enlists commitments, motivates action, and 
builds a collective conscience to the extent that actors accept and internalize it in 
their personality, as they become subjects to their socialization99. Each person is 
influenced by experience, and each person also actively creates a persona as a 
political actor through an ongoing process of conscious choice. Through this 
process of creation and self-creation, then, foreign policy actors acquire a particular 
Weltanschauung or ideologically based world-view100”. Furthermore, the ideas of 
decision-makers about political reality, whether simple and intuitive or highly 
complex and formally articulated, configure their environment for choice, inform 
their consideration of various courses of action, and provide rationalizations for the 
choices that are made101. If we take Chinese decision makers for example, like in 
the Soviet Union or other communist regime, these members of the Chinese 
Communist political bureaucracy have received administration and governmental 
training, and these administrators acquired a technical or administrative 
experience through ideological and political training102. 
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From a broader perspective, it was mentioned by another scholar that “the 
adoption as well as subsequent adaption of an ideology are in themselves 
behaviour, and may have been caused by prior behaviour103”. Therefore, no matter 
how universally valid the substance of an ideology is claimed to be, its actual 
application to the real world has historically always taken place within a certain 
national context, and is thus constrained by the latter’s particular objective 
empirical conditions. It may be essential to ask “how and why people adopted an 
ideology in the first place104”. Since objective empirical conditions and prior 
behaviour are said to play a role in the adoption of an ideology, it is relevant to ask 
ourselves if, for example, such conditions as China’s disintegration and foreign 
invasion played a part in the adoption of communism by the Party in 1921, then a 
change in those objective empirical conditions and a different experience, with 
China’s reintegration and participation within the international system, may have 
led to a corresponding change in the ideology and behaviour of the same Party105.  
 
Ideology and Policy-Making 
While neoclassical realists recognized the influence of ideas on foreign 
policy, criticism was brought upon the fact that they rarely aimed attention at how 
ideas worked in the decision-making process to mediate structural pressures and 
why some ideas were adopted as policies. I will try to rectify that by adding some 
theoretical insights to support the assumption that ideology does have a role to 
play in the formulation and implementation of Chinese foreign policy. As 
mentioned earlier, the principles of an ideology are assimilated by decision makers, 
and therefore, can be said to act as filters not only for their perception of issues and 
problems in foreign affairs, but also for the range of policy options to be 
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implemented. A central concern for all students of ideology is the extent to which, 
and the ways in which, ideology affects practice. As Sargent (2009) notes, political 
leaders use the language of the dominant ideology of their country to justify their 
actions, but are these actions actually based on ideology or convenience106? The 
most likely effect of ideology on political action is in filtering and limiting options, 
ruling out policies that fail to resonate with the national political culture107. In this 
way, ideology limit, but does not determine practice108. 
 
In states where particular ideas are highly institutionalized or culturally 
embedded, their impact is likely to be strong and consistent throughout the policy 
process. Ideas that form a strong component of national identity or strategic 
culture are likely to be almost unconsciously shared among ruling elites and 
foreign policy institutions109. This is especially true for a Leninist one-party system 
like China’s, where decision making on key policy issues is still highly centralized110 
and ideology serves as a legitimization of the political system and transforms 
power into authority111. In China, where survival of the Marxist-Lenininist ideology 
is directly linked to the legitimacy of the one-party system, the Party and the 
leadership, it is highly probable that ideological considerations are taken into 
account in formulating both foreign and domestic policies. 
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Ideology and Chinese Foreign Policy 
While acknowledging that today’s Chinese Communist ideology is not as it 
was at the beginning and that its relevance has been questioned by many in light of 
the integration of economic reforms borrowed from capitalism, this study argues 
that ideology still plays a role in the leadership’s foreign policy outlook and 
formulations. If an ideological system is one in which political leaders guide a 
society along the lines of their own political beliefs and aspirations (Brzezinski and 
Huntington, 1964), then China’s system still fits with this definition. As Chen (1995) 
explains, China’s political system still requires a theoretical basis for all major 
policies to sustain the system’s legitimacy. The party still has to present policy 
changes in consonance with ideology rhetoric; even a pragmatic policy has to be 
made ideologically sound112. Furthermore, “the Party’s refusal to renounce its 
ideology, which sharply contradicts its economic policies and its continuing 
insistence on the concept of ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’, clearly 
indicates that ideology still matters113”. 
 
With Tiananmen and the crisis of world communism, CCP leaders re-
emphasized the importance of their ideology as they were unwilling to discard 
Marxism-Leninism entirely and wanted to defend Chinese socialism against 
proponents of other ideologies that could challenge the Party’s monopoly of power. 
Ideological rivals, with the United States in the forefront, were suspected of seeking 
to discredit socialist ideology in order to overthrow the rule of the CCP114. Deng 
once stated that “the entire imperialist Western world plans to make all socialist 
countries discard the socialist road and then bring them under the control of 
international monopoly capital”, and his successor, Jiang Zemin, made a similar 
comment about “peaceful evolution” and the hostile international forces: 
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Bourgeois liberalization is an internal matching force which they use to 
carry out peaceful evolution. These kinds of hostile activities constitute a 
real threat to China’s independence, sovereignty, development and reform. 
In other words, peaceful evolution and bourgeois liberalization are aimed 
not only at overthrowing our socialist system but, fundamentally, at 
depriving us of our national independence and state sovereignty115. 
 
With the erosion of the Marxist-Leninist ideology that threatened to 
undermine the central role of the Communist Party, producing not only a crisis of 
faith but also a crisis of power, Deng Xiaoping and his associates attempted to 
foster an ideological revival within China, to justify their own rule and their policy 
choices inside and outside the borders116, and to protect the nation’s distinct 
political identity117. Consequently, instead of disappearing as a factor in foreign 
policy, Chinese Communist ideology was redefined. 
 
As Levine (1994) explains, post-Mao leaders viewed Marxism-Leninism as 
the ideological framework of long-term goals and fundamental social values within 
which an advanced industrial economy and a modern society would be constructed 
over a period of many decades. “Adherence to Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong 
Thought and the leadership of the CCP was defined as the guarantee of social and 
political stability without which developmental goals could not be achieved118”. In 
other words, the redefinition of socialism in terms of economic productivity 
provided the post-Mao leadership with strong theoretical support for its 
modernization efforts119. The domestic watchwords of stability and prosperity 
were extended to the realm of foreign policy, as the revolutionary, transformative 
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rhetoric of Maoist ideology was shelved in favour of a language of accommodation 
to the prevailing world system. Since the 1980s, peace and development have been 
emphasized as China’s major international goals and the necessary conditions for 
the attainment of China’s modernization120, which explains in part why pragmatism 
and multilateralism were adopted as China’s guidelines for action121. 
 
Although Deng’s “socialism with Chinese characteristics” may have evolved 
into something quite different from the communism Mao envisioned, China’s rulers 
have shown no desire to conform to the liberal political order that dominates much 
of the world today, much less to allow that order to change their regime122. Since it 
is argued here that Chinese Communist ideology restrain the leadership’s foreign 
policy options and filters perception of the international environment, it seems 
relevant to at least summarize its main components. 
 
Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, and the 
“Three Represents” 
For the Chinese, pure ideology corresponds to theory (lilun), while practical 
ideology refers to thought (sixiang)123. As previously mentioned, while practical 
ideology can change and evolve, theory, however, is a universal truth and cannot be 
altered. The fact that Chinese Communists regard theory as unchanging, means that 
it alone is not capable of leading to action124. Having taken its basic elements from 
Marxism-Leninism, parallel to ideas developed in the Soviet Union, the Chinese 
Communists have made the Party’s ideology into a systematic set of principles 
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which it used to create its own organization and to achieve its goals125. They 
developed a practical ideology based on Leninism but enriched by their experience 
in revolutionary struggle126. Officially, the CCP’s total ideology is described as 
Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, and Jiang Zemin’s 
“Three Represents” theory added to the Party’s constitution after the 16th Party 
Congress in 2002127. Here is an overview of each of these components. 
 
To begin with, Karl Marx’s work began with the proposition that the 
character of any society is determined the mode of production by which people 
make their living. He suggested that the mode of production circumscribes social 
structure and political order, and determines social ideas and customs. Therefore, 
to change the minds of the people, it is necessary to change the mode of production 
or the economic system128. Using Hegelian dialectics, Marx predicted that a 
communist society would result from historical materialism after society had 
passed through certain stages129, which will not be discussed here. Marxism would 
then be slightly modified by Lenin’s insights. With respect to organization for the 
revolution, Lenin outlined a strategy for the working class to achieve and maintain 
political power. One of the core principle was that a revolutionary party was 
needed, led by a highly disciplined and dedicated contingent of professional 
revolutionaries. Another principle was the doctrine of “democratic centralism”, 
which called for centralized decision making, with free discussion at the policy 
formulation level130. In his work State and Revolution (1918), Lenin advocated a 
dictatorship of the proletariat under a single political party within a socialist state. 
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The development and dictatorship of this political party would destroy capitalism 
in the interest of the proletariat131.  
 
The second element embedded in Chinese Communist ideology is the 
Thought of Mao Zedong. Mao’s ideas were very complex as they had their roots in 
the Chinese nationalism of the May Fourth Movement, in the Marxist-Leninist 
tradition, and in the revolutionary experiences of the CCP132. Mao made four key 
modifications to Marxist-Leninist doctrine when developing his ideology for China. 
First, the revolutionary leader was convinced of the enormous potential of the 
peasantry. Because Marxist-Leninist doctrine regarded the peasantry only as an 
auxiliary force in the “proletarian revolution”, Mao adapted it to give a greater role 
to the Chinese peasantry. Second, he formulated the concept of the mass line, which 
is considered Mao’s theoretical contribution to populism. The mass line, as defined 
by John W. Lewis, is “the basic working method by which Communist cadres seek to 
initiate and promote a unified relationship between themselves and the Chinese 
population and thus to bring about the supported and active participation of the 
people133”. It was the vision that semiliterate peasants and workers – collectively, 
the masses – could be the source of ideas and inspiration for the leaders134. 
 
A third aspect of Mao’s Thought was the modification of Marx’s principle of 
“dialectical materialism”. Mao combined dialectical materialism and the neo-
Confucian school of Idealism. He proposed that the process of knowledge has three 
stages: perception, conception, and verification, and emphasized the pertinence of 
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ideology to action, i.e., the unity of theory and practice135. Mao’s practical ideology 
functions as a guide on which individuals in Chinese society shape their attitudes 
and regulate their behaviour. In other words, Mao’s Thought serves as a set of 
preferred social values against which actions and thoughts are judged136. Mao also 
insisted that because contradictions are inherent in human relations, they 
therefore govern politics. All in all, Maoism, unlike Marxism, remains to some 
extent within the Confucian tradition of leadership, which always has regarded 
moral instruction to be the first duty of the head of state137. Finally, Mao’s fourth 
modification was the concept of “new revolution”, rejecting Russian leader Nikita 
Khrushchev’s peaceful coexistence138.  
 
After Mao’s death, the Communist Party under Deng Xiaoping’s new 
leadership criticized the disasters and failures of Mao’s politics such as the Great 
Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, but it recognized Mao’s contributions to 
the Party’s formal ideology139. With the hope of retrieving the people’s trust in the 
Party and rebuilding China’s stature domestically and internationally, Deng 
emphasized the need for economic reforms, even if this meant great concessions. 
Deng Xiaoping Theory, better known as “building socialism with Chinese 
characteristics”, enhanced and integrated “the universal principle of Marxism-
Leninism with the practice of the Second Chinese Revolution (Mao’s Revolution 
being the first) – economic construction, reform, and opening to the outside 
world140”.  
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Deng and the other reformers always considered that there was no change 
in the economic base of Chinese socialism, since the public ownership of the means 
of production was maintained. Individualized economy and joint ventures with 
foreign capitalist investors could be justified because these experiments were 
considered “necessary supplements to the social economy141”. But as we know, the 
paradox of justifying capitalist economic policies as a means to “enhance” 
socialism142 was hard to swallow for the conservatives and the general public. At 
the 14th Party Congress in October 1992, Deng’s ideas and policies were elevated to 
the status of theory143, and since the 15th Party Congress of 1997, they are 
enshrined into the constitution, together with Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong 
Thought as China’s permanent “guide to action144”. 
 
Not long after endorsing the role of Deng Xiaoping’s successor, Jiang Zemin 
with the help of numerous advisers such as Hu Jintao, developed the “Theory of the 
Three Represents145”. The theory suggested that to remain relevant and to prosper, 
the party “must represent the foremost production forces, the most advanced 
culture, and the broadest interests of common people146”. One of the core principles 
of Jiang’s theory was that private entrepreneurs, managers, and other professionals 
should be accepted as members of the CCP and even promoted to senior positions, 
since they could be said to represent the highest-level productivity and culture. 
This proposition originated from the early years of the reform era with the 
abandon by the CCP of the old-days’ goal of promoting class struggle for the task of 
promoting economic modernization. The change in goals called for a change in 
criteria for recruiting new members and appointing new personnel to key posts in 
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the party and the government. However, with the events of Tiananmen in1989, the 
CCP had imposed a ban on recruiting entrepreneurs, which delayed the process of 
co-opting the “capitalists”147. It was not until July 2001, that Jiang formally opened 
the door to “outstanding elements” of the “new social strata”148. Another principle 
of the Theory of the Three Represents was that the CCP had evolved into a party for 
all classes and all people, i.e., a party for all the people. From now on, the CCP would 
have to justify its rule as a party that promotes the welfare of all Chinese, 
regardless of “class origin”149. 
 
Theoretically, according to Chen (1994), the fundamental ideology of the 
CCP has several interrelated functions; to determine the Party’s final goal, to 
legitimate the CCP’s leading role in society, to define the social and political order 
the CCP wants to maintain, and to provide an ontological framework to evaluate 
everything from policies to social behaviour150. In this sense, the Party needs the 
fundamental principles for its self-claimed legitimacy, and to preserve the 
continuity of the polity, to define its unique status in society, to maintain a socialist 
image, and to prevent potential political groups from demanding power sharing151. 
On the other hand, Mao Zedong Thought, as part of the CCP’s practical ideology, 
calls for unity between the leaders and encourages them to rely on the masses for 
inspiration, support, and implementation of policies and programs152. 
 
As we are more familiarized with China’s Communist ideology and more 
aware of the potential influence ideology can have on policy making, it will be 
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easier to discern if fundamental and instrumentals principles of the CCP’s ideology 
have an impact on the formulation and implementation of China’s DPRK policy. 
Because official documents such as the Party and the state’s constitutions or Party 
Congress reports reiterate Party rules which affirm the major ideas that govern 
party policy, organization, and action153, we know that these documents consist of a 
systematic presentation of the Chinese communist ideology. Therefore, we will 
compare those fundamental principles to actual actions, as we extract from reports, 
newspaper articles, and official statements, the Chinese leadership’s 
recommendations for decisions regarding North Korea’s nuclear program. But 
before embarking on the analysis of China’s DPRK policy since 2002, our last step 
leads to the third and last variable expected to intervene in the process of foreign 
policy, the foreign policy decision-making unit.  
 
How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy 
To my knowledge, there are no neoclassical realists who aimed their 
attention at the type of unit responsible with foreign policy making when seeking 
explanations for decisions, except for those who analyzed the link between the 
personality of leaders and policy choices. Again, it was a challenge to find a method 
that could be applied to test this last hypothesis, but it was equally motivating, 
since it would add new insights to the general theory. On the whole, three different 
methods were integrated to the neoclassical framework to analyze each 
intervening variables’ impact on foreign policy, and eventually test the propositions 
on Chinese foreign policy in general, and more specifically, China’s DPRK policy. 
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The Decision Units Framework 
In the article “How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy: A Theoretical 
Framework154”, Margaret G. Hermann presents the decision making approach she 
collaborated on, with Charles Hermann, Joe Hagan, and others, back in the 
1980s155. At the core of this approach is the idea that there is at the apex of foreign 
policy decision making in all governments or ruling parties, an individual or set of 
individuals which possess the ability to commit the resources of the society and the 
authority to make a decision when faced with a problem; a decision that cannot be 
readily reversed by other entities within the government156. This set of decision 
makers is called the “authoritative decision unit”. Three types of decision units are 
said to be found in the various decision-making bodies around the world: a 
predominant leader, a single group, or a coalition of autonomous actors. And it is 
recognized that for issues of vital importance to a country, the highest political 
authorities are usually part of the decision unit, while with more routine problems, 
the decision unit might be at a much lower level157. In other words, the actors 
responsible for decision making can vary depending on the kind of problem the 
government is facing (military, economic, …)158. 
 
The decision units framework propose a way to monitor when each of these 
types of units is likely to be involved in making foreign policy decision and how the 
structure and process in the unit can shape the nature of that decision159. By 
focusing on the stage of choice in the decision-making process, that is, the selection 
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of a particular course of action, the authors argue that knowledge about how 
foreign policy decisions are made provides insight into the intentions and 
strategies of governments and how decisions of the situation are translated into 
action160. As M. Hermann mentions: 
[w]hat happens within a decision unit in the decision-making process can 
lead to an array of different kinds of outcomes, […] decision-making 
dynamics do not have a direct, singular impact on foreign policy. Rather, 
they can produce various results from consensus to deadlock, from 
compromise to domination by one individual or faction161.  
 
Accordingly, the proposed framework defines key factors that set into motion 
alternative decision processes, and links these alternative decision processes to 
particular outcomes162. 
 
Occasions for decision are described as the instances in dealing with a 
problem when the policymakers are faced with making a choice. “They are those 
points in the decision process when there is a felt need by those involved to take 
action even if the action is the choice to do nothing or to search for more 
information163”. The questions that instigate occasions for decision generally take 
one of the following forms: asking about whether or not action is needed for this 
problem, asking for possible solutions to a problem, or asking about whether one 
or more proposals for dealing with this aspect of the problem should be adopted164. 
Since the third kind of occasion for decision leads to a strategic decision in which a 
particular action is chosen and resources are committed, it is the one that the 
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decision units framework focuses on165. Figure 2 presents the sets of factors 
considered in determining which of the three types of decision units mentioned 
above, will have the ultimate authority to respond to a particular occasion for 
decision. 
 
Figure 2 – Factors determining the nature of the authoritative decision unit for an 
occasion for decision 
 
Source: Hermann, M. (2001), p.58. 
 
Conditions Favouring a Single Group in China 
With respect to China, it is important to note that the present structure of 
foreign policy decision-making has its roots in the Leninist-type of organization, 
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but gradually evolved during the post-Mao era under rules emphasizing intraparty 
democracy and collective leadership166. The new leadership under Deng Xiaoping 
and other reformers consisted for the most part of old revolutionaries that 
returned to positions of power after the Cultural Revolution and after Mao’s death. 
They had come to realize that the movement for class and human liberation they 
had supported had turned into one of the most oppressive systems in Chinese 
history, and following their rehabilitation, they urged sweeping bureaucratic 
reforms, as early as 1982, reversing the past trend toward an all-powerful party-
state that imposes tighter controls over society167. 
 
Deng insisted on the professionalization of the PLA, gradually decreasing the 
authority of the generals within the CCP leadership, while reviving the activities of 
the CCP’s foreign-affairs bureaucracy – the Central Committee’s International 
(Liaison) Department168. Revolutionary cadres were replaced with bureaucratic 
technocrats, more qualified in terms of political experience, socialization, and value 
orientation. These technocrats were selected for their expertise needed to help 
China’s industrialization rather than for their revolutionary potential, as it was 
practice during Mao’s years169. As Lee (1991) mentioned, their promotion to 
political positions was not based on their leadership ability but on the belief that 
their rigorous scientific training would enable them to grasp any problem in its 
totality and to find the solution through an analytical approach 170 . “The 
bureaucratic technocrats have a better understanding and better qualifications to 
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deal with such prerequisites of industrialized society as functional specialization, 
coordination of various parts, rational decision-making, and problem solving171”.  
 
While Deng Xiaoping still embodied the role of a predominant leader until 
the end of his rule, new leaders such as Jiang and Hu would need the expertise and 
broad inputs that come from consulting the wide range of bureaucratic and non-
government specialists and interests. In Sutter (2010)’s words, to do otherwise 
would risk ineffective or mistaken policies that can have a direct impact on top 
Chinese leaders, whose legitimacy depend heavily on demonstrating an ability to 
advance Chinese power and influence without major international complications or 
confrontation172. But at the same time, those new leaders would have to fulfill three 
roles simultaneously; what Chinese political scientists call the “three in one” 
(sanheyi) principle or organizational model173, being president of the government, 
CCP general secretary, and chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC). In 
any event, the Secretary General-President-Commander in Chief would embody the 
key final decision-maker, and exerts preeminent and ultimate power in foreign 
affairs174. 
 
Nevertheless, foreign policy making, as in all areas of politics and 
administration, was bound to increasing institutionalization, higher education 
preparation of officials, and more collective decision making175. A more pluralistic 
range of Chinese decision makers representing a variety of government, party, and 
military bureaucracies, government-affiliated and non-government think tanks, 
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and provincial and local governments, would influence foreign policy and 
behaviour176. The Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP), which approves key foreign policy choices, translates this diversity of 
interests; each member supervising six different functional sectors from: 1) 
military affairs; 2) legal affairs; 3) administrative affairs, which is responsible for 
industrial and agricultural production, finance and commerce, foreign affairs, 
health, education, science, sports, and so on; 4) propaganda; 5) United Front, 
responsible for non-communist political parties, religion, and minorities, as well as 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao affairs, and; 6) mass organization affairs, which is 
responsible for unions, youth, women’s organizations, and other associations177. 
 
In David M. Lampton’s The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in 
the Era of Reform, 1978-2000, contributor Samuel S. Kim acknowledges that since it 
is not possible to observe Beijing’s decision-making process directly, we can only 
draw causal inferences and certain basic rules about its decision-making from its 
patterns of manifest action178. Noting this fact and considering the elements 
mentioned above about the previous and actual leaderships, we will focus on the 
dynamics of decision making in a single group, proposed by the decision units 
framework. We can say that there is a dominant leader in China, the Secretary 
General-President-Commander in Chief, but so long as he views his advisers as 
members of a decision-making team, the decision unit takes on the characteristics 
of a single group that is interactive and collective in its decision making179. Even 
with respect to the issues selected for China’s DPRK policy analysis, the variety of 
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interests that are entwined in the central goal of peace and stability in the east-
Asian region in general, and in the Korean peninsula, makes it unlikely that 
decisions are proposed and authorized by the leader without consultation or by 
institutions at a lower level. 
 
Group Decision-Making Dynamics, Process Outcome and Attributes of 
Foreign Policy Response 
Regardless of its size, the single group acts as the decision unit, so long as 
there is a collective, interactive decision process in which all members who are 
needed to make authoritative commitments participate. Once we know about the 
type of decision unit, we have to consider the dynamics of problem-solving within 
that unit, because they can affect the choice or nature of a decision. More precisely, 
since disagreements within a single-group decision unit are to be expected, its 
operation is likely to be conditioned by the techniques that are used to manage 
disagreement and conflict within the group. As Charles F. Hermann and his 
colleagues explain, a group’s management of substantive disagreements among its 
members affects the resulting output, that is, their “solution” to the problem180. 
Since conflict in a problem-solving group can be debilitating, members often devote 
energy to developing ways of dealing with substantive differences181.  
 
We can find three models in the literature to describe how single groups 
cope with conflict: 1) members act to minimize conflict by promoting concurrence 
(groupthink); 2) members acknowledge that disagreement is a fundamental part of 
the decision-making process and seek to resolve the conflict through debate and 
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compromise (bureaucratic politics); and 3) even though disagreements are likely, 
members recognize that such conflict may have no resolution and approve a rule to 
govern decision making (winning majority). To differentiate between these 
dynamics, two variables are of particular use, the extent to which members of the 
group identify with the group itself or with external organizations, and the decision 
rules used by the group182. As M. Hermann explains: 
A focus on building concurrence and denying conflict is more likely when 
members’ loyalties lie within the group. Members are concerned with what 
is happening in the group itself, in maintaining morale and cohesiveness, 
and in retaining their position in the group. When members’ loyalties lie 
outside the group, the rules in place to guide decision making help to 
differentiate if conflict is accepted or resolved. With a unanimity decision 
rule, members recognize that no solution is possible unless it is acceptable 
to everyone; with a majority decision rule, members agree to abide by what 
a certain percentage of the group decides183. 
 
The type of solution group members will come up with to manage 
disagreement are differentiated as: a) deadlock, i.e., a situation of stalemate in 
which group members reach no decision on how to resolve their differences; b) 
prevalent solution, referring to a situation in which the group selects the one 
option that has been discussed from the outset. It translates concurrence around a 
particular choice. Such circumstances may result when no other option is perceived 
to meet the apparent decision criteria, when norms prevent articulating an 
alternative to an option advocated by an authoritative group member, or when 
there is a shared set of beliefs about what is appropriate in the particular context; 
c) subset solution, that is, a solution satisfactory to some faction in the group; and 
d) integrative solution, which consists of an alternative that in the course of the 
group discussion comes to represent the preference of all members and involves 
some shift from their initial choices184. In Figure 3, group problem-solving 
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dynamics are illustrated, with reference to a few variables that can lead the process 
to a type of solution. 
 
Figure 3 – Determinants of Group Decision Outputs 
 
Source: Hermann, Stein, and al., (2001), p.146. 
 
Finally, Hermann, M. (2001) further argued that, depending on the type of 
solution selected to deal with disagreements within the group, characteristics of 
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the foreign policy decision will differ 185 . For example, the government’s 
commitment of resources is less likely to be assertive when there is concurrence or 
one party’s preferences are represented in the decision, than when the decision 
represents no one’s position or a mixture of the preferences of the parties involved. 
Similarly, when there is concurrence or one party’s preferences are represented in 
the decision, foreign policy initiatives are more likely to be taken. On the other 
hand, when deadlock is the outcome of the decision process, reactions to stimuli 
from the international environment are more likely. In other words, decisions are 
less likely to involve the use of a government’s higher-priced instruments of 
statecraft (economic and military) when they involve compromise or deadlock than 
when members of the decision unit concur or one party’s position prevails186. 
 
Table 2 – Substantive Nature of Decisions Corresponding to Various Process 
Outcomes 
Process 
Outcome 
Commitment of 
Resources 
Intensity 
of Affect 
Willingness to 
Take Initiative 
Instruments of 
Statecraft Used 
Dominant 
Solution 
(Concurrence) 
High Strong High Military/Economic 
Deadlock Minimal Neutral React Diplomatic if any response demanded
Integrative 
Solution 
(Mutual 
compromise) 
Moderate Low Moderate Diplomatic 
Subset Solution 
(One party’s 
solution 
prevails) 
High/Moderate Moderate High/Moderate Military/Economic 
Source: Hermann, M. (2001), p.74. 
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In line with this framework, we will focus on the unit at the apex of China’s 
foreign policy decision-making structure, the Politburo Standing Committee, to 
observe the link between this group and foreign policy, in the next section. 
However, to better understand the responsibility of the PBSC we should further 
examine the Party and the government’s interlocking structure and decision-
making. 
 
Chinese Foreign Policy Decision-Making Structure 
As mentioned earlier, China’s economic development priority and the 
increasing complexity of its international interests have intensified the need to 
better coordinate the activities of the various Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and 
state organs involved, and increase awareness of any impacts on China’s interests, 
by consulting a range of experts on various fields187. However, decision making in 
the area of foreign policy has remained highly centralized and concentrated in the 
supreme leading bodies of the CCP, such as the Politburo Standing Committee, the 
various leading groups dealing with foreign affairs (Foreign Affairs Work Leading 
Small Group (FAWLSG), all chaired by China’s paramount leader188, and state 
institutions. 
 
The CCP’s Leading Organs 
In James Wang’s Contemporary Chinese Politics: An Introduction, we learn 
that in China, the Communist Party controls and directs the complex system of 
government machinery, and it is through the agencies of the government that the 
policies and programs approved by the Party are implemented189. Although all 
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Communist states accept the fact that under socialism there is a distinction 
between state and Party190, the Party can manage to control the state bureaucracy 
by supervising its personnel. Therefore, it is the CCP that has the final word over 
state and armed forces in all political decision making191. This will be very 
important to remember for the next section on China’s DPRK policy. Formally 
speaking the highest executive forum is the Central Committee (CC), consisting of 
over three-hundred members, working as advisors for state policies, which in turn 
assigns power to the Politburo and its Standing Committee (PBSC)192. Collective 
power is traditionally exerted by the Politburo and the Secretariat of the CCP’s 
Central Committee. However, according to Cabestan (2009), the Politburo does not 
meet frequently enough to approve every major foreign policy decision, and the 
CC’s Secretariat no longer plays a key role in foreign affairs193. 
 
State Institutions 
State institutions, like the Foreign Ministry or the Ministry of Commerce – 
previously known as the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation – as 
well as the PRC presidency, play a role in foreign policy decision making hard to 
disconnect from that of the CCP and the position their respective leaders hold in the 
Party194. It is not a coincidence that the PRC president is also the CCP General 
Secretary, since it became common sense that, the state must work in symbiosis 
with the Party, in order to protect its legitimacy and look after its interests.  
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The State Council, as the highest executive organ of state power, runs the 
state’s foreign policy apparatus. It is composed of a premier, vice-premier, 
secretary-general, state councillors, and ministers in charge of ministries and 
commissions. The State Council is responsible for carrying out the principles and 
policies of the CCP, and according to article 89 of the RPC’s constitution, is 
responsible for dealing with such affairs as China’s internal politics, diplomacy, 
national defence, finance, economy, culture, and education. Under the present 
Constitution, the State Council exercises the power of administrative legislation, the 
power to submit proposals, the power of administrative leadership, economic 
management, diplomatic administration, and social administration. It also has the 
function to formulate the tasks and responsibilities of the ministries and 
commissions of the State Council, to exercise unified leadership over the work of 
the ministries and commissions and to direct all other administrative work of a 
national character that does not fall within the jurisdiction of the ministries and 
commissions195. 
 
Four of the State Council ministries, out of twenty-nine, are concerned with 
foreign policy: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Commerce, the 
Defence Ministry, and in special cases, the People’s Bank196. The main body for 
foreign policy recommendations and implementation is the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs197. The MFA is responsible for day-to-day foreign policy, makes many 
diplomatic decisions, is a unique source of analyses and information about the 
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outside world, a major source of proposals on policy options, and a privileged 
channel of foreign-policy implementation198.  
 
Leading Small Groups 
Leading small groups’ central purpose is to allow key government, party, 
and military components to have input into key foreign policy decisions. Another 
purpose is to allow the leader and his advisors to benefit from these contributions 
as they seek to formulate effective policies that reflect the expertise and interests of 
key parts of the Chinese administration199. LSG’s such as, the National Security 
Leading Small Group (NSLSG), Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (FALSG), 
Taiwan Leading Small Group, Hong Kong LSG and Macau LSG, are not empowered 
to make final decisions, and their proposals must be formally endorsed by the 
PBSC200. In fact, most of them are chaired by the State’s general secretary. With the 
globalization of China’s economy, the role of LSGs in charge of finance and 
economy, energy issues, and global warming has also increased201.  
 
Overall, while we can consider the general process of Chinese foreign policy 
making and the organs involved in it, it remains ambiguous to propose an accurate 
description of the power center where decisions are actually made and 
approved202. China’s North Korea policy decision making is no exception and we 
can only make assumptions based on official statements, and scholarly papers and 
monographs.
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 Part Two 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
Case Study: China’s DPRK Policy from a Neoclassical 
Realist Standpoint 
 
It is now time to test our three hypotheses in the context of China’s policy 
toward its neighbour, North Korea. The methods proposed earlier to analyze 
foreign policy determinants – the leadership’s perception of power, ideology, and 
the type of decision unit responsible with foreign policy – respectively, will be 
applied with respect to three events which led to the formulation and 
implementation of a decision on China’s part. Monitoring observations based on the 
process-tracing of each response will enable comparison and help verify the 
involvement of these domestic variables between the structural pressure of the 
international environment and foreign policy, predicted by neoclassical realist 
theory. 
 
The Second Nuclear Crisis, North Korea’s Withdrawal from the 
NPT, and the Six-Party Talks (2003) 
The Second nuclear crisis between the United States and North Korea began 
in October 2002, as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs 
James Kelly confronted the regime about suspicions that it had acquired materials 
consistent with the pursuit of a nuclear weapons program based on highly enriched 
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uranium (HEU)203. One month later, the United States imposed on the Korean 
Peninsula Energy Development Organization204 (KEDO) its unilateral decision to 
stop monthly heavy fuel oil shipments that were being made in partial accordance 
with the Agreed Framework. The supply of heavy fuel oil was, in fact, reportedly 
the only one of the four articles of the Agreed Framework that the United States has 
ever respected205. Eventually, the United States refused to talk alone with North 
Korea and insisted on multilateral negotiations. As a response to Washington’s 
consistent refusal to hold bilateral talks and to the resolution adopted by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) which called for Pyongyang’s 
compliance with its obligations under the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the 
DPRK announced in January 10, 2003, its withdrawal from the non-proliferation 
treaty206. 
 
While China had kept a low profile during the 1993-1994 negotiations of the 
first nuclear crisis, the leadership came to the decision to play an active role in 
dealing with the issue and to strive to bring about a denuclearized Korea. What 
started as a three-party-talks initiative, with Beijing mediating between the two 
parties, turned into China’s hosting the Six-Party Talks in August 2003 and 
deploying tremendous efforts to bring the “crisis” under control207. By looking 
                                                        
203 Xiao Ren. 2007. «Korean Security Dilemmas: Chinese Policies». In Hazel Smith, ed. Reconstituting 
Korean Security : A Policy Primer. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, p.151. 
204 KEDO is a multinational consortium that the United States agreed to establish and lead, following the 
signature of the Agreement Framework in 1994 by the U.S. and North Korea. It would oversee the 
financing and construction of a pair of thousand-megawatt light-water reactors to replace the North’s 
existing or planned graphite-moderated reactors. Building directly on the Agreed Framework, KEDO and 
the DPRK had signed a contract for two light-water reactors to replace its nuclear complex in December 
1995, which were to be completed by 2003. For more on the first nuclear crisis and the Agreed 
Framework, see: Pollack, «The United States, North Korea, and the End of the Agreed Framework». 
205 Samuel S. Kim. 2006. «Sino-North Korean Relations in the Post-Cold War World». In Young W. Kihl and 
Hong Nack Kim, ed. North Korea : The Politics of Regime Survival. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, p.193. 
206 Kyung-Ae Park. 2004. «North Korea in 2003: Pendulum Swing between Crisis and Diplomacy». Asian 
Survey: 44 (1), p.139. 
207 Xiao Ren, «Korean Security Dilemmas...», p.159. 
65 
 
more thoroughly into the power, ideology, and decision-making contexts, we 
should find clarification regarding the determinants of China’s decision to 
participate in the Six-Party Talks. 
 
Hypothesis 1 – Leadership’s Perception of Power 
In line with its project of economic reform in late 1970s, Deng Xiaoping’s 
leadership had conveyed that the concept of comprehensive power relied not only 
on military and economic capabilities, but also on such factors as the moral and 
political unity of the people. The idea that neglecting these components of 
comprehensive power could result in the demise of the regime, just like in the 
Soviet Union208, was still vivid in the mind of successors Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao. 
In addition, since ancient times, the Chinese conception of power has been very 
different from the western view, emphasizing the glory of victory without the use 
of force, such as expressed in the classic work of Sun Tzu, The Art of War. 
 
On the matter of military power, China’s 2002 White Paper reiterated the 
country’s military doctrine of national defence as a policy of a defensive nature. As 
a strategic task in China's modernization drive, strengthening national defence is 
considered a key guarantee for safeguarding China's security and unity and 
building a well-off society in an all-round way. The fundamental basis for the 
formulation of China's national defence policy primarily includes: safeguarding 
state sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity and security; upholding economic 
development as the central task and unremittingly enhancing the overall national 
strength; adhering to and improving the socialist system; maintaining and 
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promoting social stability and harmony; and striving for an international 
environment of lasting peace and a favourable climate in China's periphery209. In 
the same mindset, “[t]he Chinese government”, it said, “is willing, together with the 
international community, to contribute to the maintenance of the legal system for 
international arms control and disarmament, and the advancement of the process 
of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation210”. China had joined the NPT 
in 1992, after nearly two decades of condemning the treaty for discrimination 
against non-nuclear countries and failure to curb the nuclear arms expansion of the 
superpowers efficiently211. It was concluded by Chinese analysts that on balance, 
joining the treaty would be more advantageous to China than remaining outside the 
NPT regime212.  
 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Chinese leadership characterized 
the distribution of power as far from equally balanced, and while acknowledging 
the status of the United States as a sole superpower, preferred multipolarity as a 
better prospect for the future. The 2002 White Paper stated that in terms of 
military technology, the gap between the developed and developing countries was 
wider than ever before, posing a challenge for the developing countries in their 
effort to safeguard sovereignty and security213. On the international political and 
economic order, the document deplored that the world’s economic development 
was materially unbalanced, widening the North-South gap, and embraced the 
developing countries’ push forward for the establishment of a fair and rational new 
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international order and participation in the promotion of peace and 
development214. 
 
Previous leader Jiang Zemin had worked to craft a so-called daguo waijiao 
(great power diplomacy) from the mid-1990s onward, recognizing that when 
America became the sole superpower it created the situation that Chinese experts 
have characterized as yichao duoqiang (“one superpower, several powers”). For 
Jiang, the key to whether China could live up to the reality and obligations of a 
“great power” in world affairs depended very much on ties with the U.S.215, which is 
why a “pro-U.S.” policy was pursued. Conversely, Hu Jintao and his colleagues have 
taken a more comprehensive, cool-headed approach to diplomacy216. Hu would 
only characterize ties with the U.S. as “a constructive, cooperative partnership”, 
giving observers the impression of being an “Europeanist”- or being as “pro-
Europe” or “pro-Russia” as Jiang was pro-United States217.  
 
The United States’ display of unilateralism and firepower in Iraq, in March 
2003, had a profound impact on the CCP leadership’s perception of the dangers of 
Bush-style neo-conservatism218. A year before, Chinese leaders were briefed on the 
White House’s National Security Strategy (NSS), which justified the United States 
taking preemptive military actions against regimes that could be developing 
WMDs219. The Bush administration had worked on putting an official end to the 
practice of assigning a set of fixed targets for the U.S. nuclear force – the vast 
majority of them in the former Soviet Union – by replacing it with a more flexible 
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system providing U.S. presidents the option of conducting a preemptive strike with 
precision-guided conventional bombs or nuclear weapons aimed at states that 
threaten or use chemical, nuclear or biological arms against the United States or its 
allies. Details of this policy, which Pentagon planners called "offensive deterrence," 
were contained in excerpts from the Pentagon's Nuclear Posture Review, which 
was sent to Congress in January 2002. Among other things, the review stated that 
immediate contingencies, which require pre-targeted weapons, included an Iraqi 
attack on Israel or its neighbours, a North Korean attack on South Korea or a 
military confrontation [with China] over the status of Taiwan220.  
 
For China, who was found listed together with North Korea as targeted 
countries, such a report was in violation of the 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework, 
which stated that “the United States will provide formal assurances to North Korea, 
against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the United States”, the proposition 
to develop small, “usable” nuclear weapons, was in contravention of Article VI of 
the NPT221. Under the circumstances, the U.S. intervention in Iraq came as a second 
red flag, added to the NATO aggression against Yugoslavia in 1999 and the U.S. 
missile strike on the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, which reflected that the U.S. had 
not abandoned the use of force to reach its objective222, and constantly violated the 
principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of a state. The same month, 
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People’s Daily commentator, Huang Peizhao commented about the U.S. moves in the 
Middle East which had “served the goal of seeking worldwide domination223”.  
 
Disapproving of policies of expansion or hegemonism, and in order to meet 
the goal of sustained economic development, the fourth-generation of leaders 
under President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao pursued a more assertive and 
multi-pronged diplomacy224. Beijing was aware that a rising, socialist China would 
remain a concern to other countries, and that its international role remains 
controversial for those proponents of the “China threat theory”. As it seeks to play a 
more responsible role internationally and regionally, China came to the conclusion 
that multilateral approaches were the best way to accomplish this goal, as the 
“threat” of too much Chinese “presence” or involvement might be decreased225. 
 
Implications for the North Korean Issue 
Beijing’s behaviour since the start of the standoff in October 2002 reflected 
a changing strategic calculus on China’s part and a reprioritization of competing 
interests and goals. China came to recognize the possibility that the U.S. and the 
DPRK might not come to any workable settlement on the nuclear issue without 
some third-party intervention226. The Iraq war was an indicator of the extremes to 
which the Bush administration was willing to go in pursuit of its objectives, and 
China worried about the escalation of the crisis between the U.S. and the DPRK, 
which would bring U.S. military power projection close to its borders227. Strongly 
opposed to the adoption of a UN Security Council resolution to condemn 
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Pyongyang’s withdrawal from the NPT, China chose to play a proactive conflict-
management role228.  
 
The evidence of a change in the PRC diplomacy was first noted when Beijing 
accepted to host the Six-Party Talks to defuse the North Korean nuclear crisis. At 
first, Chinese leaders did not have strong feelings about North Korean nuclear 
weapons because no one in China believed that they would be aimed at China or 
would pose a serious threat or direct security problem for the country229. The 
“crisis” was an issue between the DPRK and the United States. But growing security 
concerns about possible U.S. recklessness in trying to end the North Korean nuclear 
crisis through military means were a clear catalyst for Beijing’s hands-on 
diplomacy230. We have to understand that, Korea has always borne a special 
significance for China’s security because of its geopolitical location in the centre of 
Northeast Asian where the mainland and sea powers meet with each other231. 
Having an approximately 1,360 km long shared border, North Korea would always 
be a reminder of the route by which imperial Japan launched its invasion of the 
Chinese mainland in the early twentieth century, and of the U.S. intervention in the 
Korean War, when in late 1950 General MacArthur’s forces almost reached the 
Chinese border232. 
 
The nuclear issue now presented not only a danger to North Korea's 
development and survival, but also a major problem for Chinese relations with the 
US and its diplomacy in the international community. Not to mention that a 
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nuclear-armed North Korea could fuel proliferation with Tokyo, Seoul, and even 
Taipei, deciding to have their own deterrents as a guarantee of security233. The 
Chinese government regarded the Six-party Talks as a way to constrain the 
problem and keep it under control234. Added to this was the possibility that, a 
multilateral approach might enhance China’s prestige and leverage with 
Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul, while avoiding extreme reactions in Pyongyang235. 
 
A day before the August 27-29 first round of the talks took place in Beijing, 
Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi at a Joint Interview by Xinhua News Agency, 
People's Daily, CCTV, CRI and China Daily, reiterated Beijing’s stance on the issue:  
“We hold that the Korean Peninsula should be nuclear-free. At the same 
time, the DPRK's security concerns should also be addressed through the 
only means of dialogue and peaceful talks so as to maintain peace and 
stability on the peninsula. […] The root of the nuclear issue derives from 
the remaining shadow of the Cold War on the Korean peninsula. After the 
problem became acute, the main views and proposition between the DPRK 
and the US became confrontational, leading to the escalation of situation on 
the Korean peninsula. […] We are against such actions as sanctions or 
coerce, least to mention war. We sincerely hope the nuclear issue can be 
resolved peacefully. […] China hopes all parties will take into consideration 
the general situation of safeguarding peace and stability of the Korean 
peninsula, show sincerity to solve the issue, adopt a calm and patient 
attitude, respect each other, conduct consultations on an equal footing, 
seek common grounds, and reduce disputes, so as to ensure the talks to 
continue and yield peace236”. 
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Hypothesis 2 – Ideology 
Heike Holbig237, senior research fellow at the GIGA Institute of Asian Studies, 
editor of the Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, and specialist in PRC domestic 
politics, analysed the Chinese Communist Party’s ideological reform in the 
aftermath of the Sixteenth Party Congress. From Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao, the 
reemphasis on ideology and the inclusion of the concepts of Harmonious Socialist 
Society and of a Scientific Outlook on Development in the party constitution at the 
Seventeenth Party Congress have been tremendously significant. Moreover, after 
Hu Jintao was elected general secretary, the elitist concept of the Three Represents 
was reinterpreted in a populist manner by shifting the emphasis to representation 
of the interests of the people from that of the “advanced social productive 
forces238”. 
 
Based on the analysis of recent elite debates, Holbig argues that re-
formulation of the CCP’s ideology since 2002 has been the consequence of 
perceived challenges to the legitimacy of CCP rule. Contrary to many Western 
commentators, who see China’s successful economic performance as the most 
important if not the only source of regime legitimacy, Chinese party theorists and 
scholars have come to regard Deng Xiaoping’s formula of performance-based 
legitimacy as increasingly precarious. In order to tackle the perceived 
“performance dilemma” of party rule, the adaptation and innovation of party 
ideology is regarded as a crucial measure to re-legitimize CCP rule239. In Duchâtel’s 
words, “Party and academic elites have repeatedly emphasized the legitimizing 
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function of ideology and the adaptation of Marxism to the needs of a society 
experiencing tremendous transformation since the beginning of the reform era240”. 
 
It is also important to note that while not too many Hu Jintao’s Communist 
Youth League (CYL) affiliates are found in government departments, particularly in 
areas dealing with the economy, trade, and foreign affairs, those who have filled 
senior CCP positions at the 16th Party Congress are for the most part party affairs 
specialists241. Hu himself began his first term as party boss with a package of plans 
to perpetuate the CCP’s ruling party status. He has conscientiously promoted the 
status of party organs even in government and economic fields242. It is no surprise 
that, as Lam (2006) observed, while the majority of CYL members are specialists in 
Communist ideology, organization, and propaganda issues, they often consider the 
survival and welfare of the party as the be-all and end-all of statecraft243. 
 
At the Sixteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) 
on November 8, 2002, Jiang Zemin delivered to the future leadership his report 
entitled "Build a Well-off Society in an All-Round Way and Create a New Situation 
in Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics". The theme of the congress, it 
says, “is to hold high the great banner of Deng Xiaoping Theory, fully act on the 
important thought of Three Represents, carry forward our cause into the future, 
keep pace with the times, build a well-off society in an all-round way, speed up 
socialist modernization and work hard to create a new situation in building 
socialism with Chinese characteristics”.  
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Looking back at the theory on ideology and foreign policy, it was mentioned 
that the ideas of decision-makers about political reality had a certain influence, 
since they configure their environment for choice, inform their consideration of 
various options, and provide rationalizations for the choices that were made244. 
The mindset on the actual international environment read as follows in the Party 
Congress report: 
The trends toward world multipolarization and economic 
globalization are developing amidst twists and turns. Science and 
technology are advancing rapidly. Competition in overall national strength 
is becoming increasingly fierce. Given this pressing situation, we must 
move forward, or we will fall behind. Our Party must stand firm in the 
forefront of the times and unite with and lead the Chinese people of all 
ethnic groups in accomplishing the three major historical tasks: to propel 
the modernization drive, to achieve national reunification and to safeguard 
world peace and promote common development, and in bringing about the 
great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation on its road to socialism with 
Chinese characteristics. This is a grand mission history and the era have 
entrusted to our Party245. 
 
With respect to foreign policy, we can assume that these three major tasks 
advanced in the Party rules, would affect the nature of Beijing’s policy decisions. 
Any decisions that would undermine the modernization drive, national 
reunification and safeguard of world peace, and the progress of socialism with 
Chinese characteristics, would bring criticism to the decision-makers. This might 
explain why emphasis is also put on collective leadership and a more consultative 
decision-making manner. 
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Party Principles and the Six-Party Talks 
As a way to test the theory that ideology is a determinant of China’s DPRK 
policy, we will consider provisions extracted from the Sixteenth Party Congress 
report of 2002, which represent core principles of the Party to lead the people in 
building socialism with Chinese characteristics, to see if they are reflected in 
China’s policy to resolve the Korean nuclear issue. 
 
First, the Party underlined the need to keep economic development as the 
central task and solve problems cropping up on the way forward through 
development. In addition, all opportunities to accelerate development should be 
seized246. With the economic dimension embedded in the Communist Party 
ideology, it is not a secret that Beijing’s dilemma toward its implication in the 
nuclear issue was affected by economic factors. On the one hand, economic 
sanctions were rejected. Under worst-case scenario, withholding food, fuel, or 
economic aid, or acquiescing to a third party’s economic sanctions could 
significantly harm the North Korean regime, resulting in internal chaos, flood of 
North Korean economic migrants into Northeast China, and discontent of the 
Chinese people already having a hard time making ends meet247. On the other hand, 
the main concern of the leadership was to avoid the outbreak of an armed conflict, 
or at the worst, war, between the U.S. and the DPRK. Since China has very deep 
economic ties with South Korea, Japan, and the United States, a Korean or regional 
war would seriously jeopardize the prospects of China’s economic development248. 
The need to diffuse the crisis was key in inducing China’s participation in the Six-
Party Talks. 
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Second, also included in the Party Congress report was the need to ensure 
stability as a principle of overriding importance and balance reform, development 
and stability: “Stability is a prerequisite for reform and development. We should 
take into full consideration the momentum of reform, the speed of development 
and the sustainability of the general public249”. Considering the nuclear crisis of 
2002, since a stable, nuclear free Korean peninsula, and to a broader extent, 
Northeast Asia, was essential for China in terms of the primary goal of economic 
development of the country, the leadership decided that it needed to take action to 
deal with it250. 
 
Third, also included in the Party Congress report were the international 
provisions of pursuing the independent foreign policy of peace, safeguarding world 
peace and promoting common development:  
We will, as always, attach paramount importance to our state sovereignty 
and security. In handling international affairs, we should observe and cope 
with the situation cool-headedly, adhere to the principle of mutual respect 
and seek common ground while shelving differences. We need to respect 
the diversity of the world, promote democracy in international relations 
and strive for a peaceful international environment and a good climate in 
areas around China251. 
 
As Krawitz (2003) explains, given Chinese aspirations of being seen as a premier 
power in Asia and credible actor on the global scene, the spectre of a possible 
public diplomacy failure and the prospect of subsequent international humiliation 
are real fears for Beijing. In order to prevent such contention, Beijing must keep 
presenting itself as skilled in international diplomacy, while also clearly 
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demonstrating that it is charting its own course. In effect, it would be unlikely to 
sign on to any initiative that might create an impression that it is following 
Washington’s lead, doing Washington’s biding, or taking Washington’s side252. 
Furthermore, China is not only concerned about economic and military 
ramifications, but also about preserving its image and credibility with Third world 
countries: 
 China has relatively been on good terms with Iran and Syria, and 
other states that Washington has historically considered supporters of 
terrorism, threatening to U.S. security interests, or otherwise suspects. 
Beijing has normal relations with these states and does not wish to create 
problems with them. Iran is for example a major supplier of oil to China. 
Certainly, the lesson would not be lost on such states if Beijing were to 
reverse suddenly its policy on North Korea, especially if such a move were 
interpreted as having occurred in response to U.S. urging. Its credibility 
would be undermined253.  
 
Principles of mutual respect and shelving differences also refer to a policy of 
neighbourliness, trustworthiness and partnership with neighbouring countries in 
Asia and the Pacific, also endorsed in the 16th CPC Congress, together with 
recommendations to increase common interests, raise trust and reduce regional 
threat perceptions of China254. As we can see, this third principle is an allusion to 
power status, and prestige in terms of a state’s weight in world affairs. This stems 
from the fact that, given the authoritarian nature of the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) political system, the CCP’s interpretations of foreign events and actions are 
transmitted as China’s national interests255. 
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Hypothesis 3 – Decision Unit 
In his account of Chinese foreign relations, Robert Sutter (2010) stressed 
that on the one hand, the mix of Chinese goals and Chinese leaders’ perceptions 
regarding Asian and world affairs influenced China’s behaviour in international 
affairs, while on the other hand, Chinese actions abroad duly took account of 
domestic priorities of stability and economic growth. Consequently, a risk-adverse 
approach that usually represented the lowest common dominator among senior 
Chinese leaders, followed by consensus, appeared to be the norm in dealing with 
the outside world256.  
 
The second nuclear crisis arose when China had just entered a new stage of 
economic reform and political succession. The 16th Party Congress supposed to 
take place in September 2002 was postponed in November because then President 
Jiang Zemin was scheduled to make an important state visit to the United States in 
late October257. Hu Jintao became CCP leader in November 2002, one month after 
the nuclear standoff began between the United States and the DPRK, but Jiang 
remained President of the PRC at least until March 2003, and chair of the CMC until 
September 2004. Although we previously mentioned that factionalism is generally 
muted in China’s web of interrelated bureaucracies, the fact that it took nearly a 
year to come up with the decision to host the Six-Party Talks increase speculation 
that consensus building in Chinese foreign policy might have been more difficult 
because of the political succession and leadership lineup258. 
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This proposition bears on the circumstances of Hu Jintao’s first year in 
power, which was overshadowed by the lingering presence of Jiang Zemin, and by 
the continuing influence of power brokers such as Zeng Qinghong and the party 
elders259. A few months before the Congress was to convene, Jiang manoeuvred to 
have Shanghai party chief Huang Ju and Beijing party boss Jia Qinglin included in 
the Politburo Standing Committee. This was despite the fact that except during 
brief periods in the Cultural Revolution, the PBSC usually consists of merely five to 
seven members so as to facilitate decision-making. The inclusion of Huang and Jia 
ensured that the nine-member top executive body would have at least four Jiang 
supporters: CCP Secretariat member Zeng Qinghong, Vice-premier Wu Bangguo, 
Huang and Jia260. In an interview conducted by Lam (2006) in 2002, a party veteran 
indicated that Jiang and Zeng’s personnel reshuffles in the run-up to the 16th Party 
Congress would deprive the new party chief of an important means of quickly 
firming up his grip over the party, government, and army. “In the Chinese tradition, 
the most effective way for a newly ensconced supremo to establish himself is 
through appointments and promotions”, he said, “[h]owever, since Jiang and Zeng 
have already filled most of the civilian and military slots with relatively young 
officials, Hu may have to wait a couple of years or more before he can make another 
series of appointments261”. 
 
Thus, it was argued that the extent of Hu’s actual power was unclear and 
that prospects for institutionalized succession had been overshadowed by factional 
politics. Some ventured that Jiang Zemin had scored a “comprehensive” victory in 
limiting the power of the new general secretary and in ensuring that his political 
line would dominate China’s development for the next couple of years262. However, 
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the outcome of the Congress led to diverging interpretations, and Hu clearly set in 
motion a process-based hold on political power. On the one hand, Bo Zhiyue (2005) 
argues that the office of the CCP general secretary holds institutionally based 
power and that it can, therefore, govern beyond a factional balance of power 
because power lies in the institution and not in the man. According to Bo, a new 
pattern in the Chinese political system has emerged from the 16th Congress, 
allowing Hu Jintao to govern through an evolving decision-making process263.  
 
On the other hand, Cheng Li264 (2009) identifies a pattern of emerging 
bipartisanship within the CCP, between an elitist coalition led by former general 
secretary Jiang Zemin, former vice president Zeng Qinghong and the incumbent 
chairman of the National People’s Congress, Wu Bangguo, and a populist coalition 
led by General Secretary Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao. With the Elitists 
being mainly princelings, and the populists coming from the Communist Youth 
League, these two coalitions are said to be political bases built on factional 
affiliations. Most importantly, each has diverging political priorities: for the former 
group, it is a further integration into the world economy; as for the latter, focus is 
on the development of the private sector and market liberalization, a more 
balanced regional development, health care and employment265.  
 
Cheng (2009) argues that this emerging pattern of bipartisanship is already 
having an impact on the decision-making process, as the distribution of power 
between the two coalitions, works as a non-institutionalized system of checks and 
balances. On the policy front, it raises new challenges for the CCP’s performance 
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because of increased bargaining and the risk of deadlock. On the political front, it 
brings a transformation which is leading to collective leadership and some form of 
Chinese-style inner-party democracy266. From Lam’s perspective, the momentum 
was going the way of the Hu Jintao- Wen Jiabao leadership and not the Shanghai 
faction. Other things being equal, an average cadre would rather link his fate with 
leaders of the future than with those of the past. Thus, PBSC members with no 
obvious factional affiliations such as Li Changchun and Luo Gan, as well as 
Politburo members Zhang Dejiang, Yu Zhengsheng, Zhang Lichang, and He 
Guoqiang, had by late 2003 begun showing signs of aligning themselves with the 
Hu faction. And, this was despite the fact that cadres such as Li Chanchun, Zhang 
Dejiang, and Yu Zhengsheng seemed to owe their rise more to Jiang than to Hu267. 
 
All in all, Hu appeared to give more emphasis than Jiang to the role of the full 
Politburo and its Standing Committee, and take into consideration 
recommendations from various bureaucracies; the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of 
Commerce, and the CCP’s International Department268. He allowed official media 
reports of Politburo decision-making activities and study sessions, as well as 
decision-making meetings of the Politburo Standing Committee269. He also invited 
CMC members and designated experts to participate in PBSC or Politburo meetings 
when he deems it necessary270.  
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Decision to Participate in the Six-Party Talks 
It is believed that given the sensitivity of North Korea policy, top Chinese 
leaders may have tried to assert greater control and so-called democratic 
centralism over such deliberations271. Since decision-making processes remain 
largely closed to outside scrutiny, it is difficult to know exactly if there was 
disagreement within the decision unit, but the fact that it took a relatively long time 
to decide, could be a sign that differences of opinion and approach had arisen. 
Assuming that the decision unit was the Politburo Standing Committee, we have 
mentioned earlier that each member represented their bureau, department, or 
some outside interest. It is their home affiliation whose views they are to present 
and defend, which reflect outside identity to the group.  
 
In addition, George Yang (1995)’s portrayal of the mechanism of policy-
making in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which offers a view on professional 
bureaucracy in the Chinese government, pointed out that consensus was required 
among the participants on the basis of frequent consultations and discussions. “The 
consensus thus reached takes the form of a formal report or a memorandum for 
approval that offers the unanimous recommendation272”. Keeping in mind the 
decision units framework, we can already get a clearer picture of the decision 
process. Members’ primary identity is outside the group, members have different 
preferences, and decision rules require all to agree. In addition, according to 
Duchâtel (2009), power brokers such as PBSC member Zeng Qinghong and the 
party elders were particularly influential in promoting the interests of the former 
president, Jiang Zemin. Such a process leads to an integrative solution as the group 
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decision output, which generally implies a diplomatic response by the leadership 
with respect to the issue at hand. 
 
Hosting the Six-Party Talks was not decided on a whim by the Chinese 
leadership. Not only did decision-makers within China have to reach consensus, but 
the parties involved, especially North Korea, had to agree on the format and 
provisions of the negotiation talks. As early as October 18, 2002, American 
Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs John R. 
Bolton and Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James A. 
Kelly had discussed the DPRK, during their visit in China. Chinese Foreign Ministry 
spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue confirmed to reporters that it was China's consistent 
stance to support the non-nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula to safeguard its 
peace and stability, and added: “the nuclear issue in the DPRK should be solved 
through peaceful means, through dialogues and consultations273”. This statement 
showed that Beijing’s position concerning the methods to be used in dealing with 
the DPRK issue was already clear to the decision unit responsible. Thus, when the 
two U.S. diplomats pressed Chinese officials to use all their diplomatic and 
economic leverage to persuade North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons 
program274, it was unlikely that the Chinese leadership would have agreed to it.  
 
If we briefly trace developments of China’s response, it seems to fit with the 
proposition extracted from the decision units framework. In February 2003, during 
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another phone conversation, President Bush suggested that the two countries 
jointly bear responsibility for achieving a nuclear-free peninsula. In order to 
alleviate the tension and to help bring the crisis under control, Beijing was 
convinced that the United States and the DPRK had to sit down to talk with each 
other. Yet the two were stuck on the terms of the talks’ format. Whereas Pyongyang 
insisted on dealing with Washington bilaterally, the Bush administration had 
learned a “lesson” from the Clinton’s administration’s experiences and rejected the 
bilateral format, hoping that other parties would take part275. At the end of May 
2003, when asked to confirm a Japanese report on the expansion of the talks to 
include Japan, South Korea, and Russia, spokeswoman on the third-party talks 
Zhang Qiyue stated that priority was to foster the Beijing talks between China, the 
United States, and the DPRK276. 
 
Finally, in July 16, a day after his visit to Pyongyang, Deputy Foreign 
Minister Dai Bingguo departed for Washington, carrying a letter from Hu Jintao to 
George W. Bush. He met with U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of State 
Colin Powell and other high-ranking officials, briefing them on his meetings with 
the North Koreans. On behalf of the Chinese government, he proposed that, as a 
next step in the trilateral meetings, talks might adopt an extended multilateral 
format in which the U.S. and the DPRK would have some extra time to talk 
bilaterally277. 
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North Korea’s Missiles and Nuclear Tests (2006) 
On July 5, 2006, North Korea defied international warnings and launched 
seven ballistic missiles, including its long-range Taepodong-2 missile. A month 
later, North Korea’s Foreign Ministry announced, in October 3, that the country 
would in the near future carry out its first nuclear test. Six days later, geo-scientific 
and intelligence stations worldwide monitored an underground nuclear test. While 
neither of Pyongyang’s nascent intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability 
and nuclear capability tests was rated as highly successful by outside experts, both 
were seen as ominous indicators of where North Korea was heading in terms of 
developing a deliverable nuclear weapons capability. Both tests were widely 
condemned by the United Nations Security Council, as members unanimously voted 
on UNSC Resolution 1695 on July 15, 2006 and UNSC Resolution 1718, on October 
14, 2006278. 
 
Hypothesis 1 – Leadership’s Perception of Power 
Since the mandate of the 16th Party Congress was effective from 2002 to 
2007, there was no succession of leadership in 2006, and no drastic changes 
regarding the perception of the elements of power at that time, except perhaps, for 
a noticeable concern over socio-political capabilities, such as political governance 
and political and national unity. For example, in an address to Central Party School 
students in early 2004, Vice-president Zeng Qinghong criticized certain cadres’ 
obsession with mere GDP growth, and argued that “we must use a scientific spirit 
and a scientific methodology” to look at economic growth and national progress. In 
other words, while measuring China’s wealth, “software elements” such as 
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educational standards, public health, and respect for the law were to be given as 
much weight as increases in manufacturing and exports279. 
 
Otherwise, the 2004 National Defense Paper reaffirmed China’s 
development goal to build a moderately prosperous society. It stated that to 
achieve the arduous task for modernization, which calls for prolonged and 
persistent hard work, China will rely mainly on its own strength for development, 
and therefore poses no obstacle or threat to anyone280. Regarding military 
capabilities, the White Paper reiterated that, as an advocate of peace, development 
and cooperation, the country adheres to an independent foreign policy of peace and 
a national defense policy of defensive nature. It promised that China would never 
pursue expansion, nor seek hegemony. The document further stated that: “A major 
strategic task of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in exercising state power is to 
secure a coordinated development of national defense and the economy, and to 
build modernized, regularized and revolutionary armed forces to keep the country 
safe281”.  
 
In September 2005, a White Paper entitled China's Endeavors for Arms 
Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation was issued at a press conference in 
Beijing by the State Council Information Office. As a foreword was a reminder that 
the year 2005 marked the 60th anniversary of the victories of the Chinese People's 
War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War, 
and the 60th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations (UN), “the most 
universal, representative and authoritative inter-governmental international 
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organization in the world282”. The section “China’s Basic Policy and Decision” read 
as follows:  
In the field of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, China 
follows the new security concept featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, 
equality and coordination, and commits itself to creating a favorable 
international and regional security environment, maintaining world peace 
and promoting common development. […] In handling affairs related to 
international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, the 
Chinese government always bases its policy-making on the judgment 
whether it serves to safeguard national sovereignty and security, whether 
it serves to maintain global strategic stability and whether it serves to 
promote security for all and mutual trust among countries283. 
 
With respect to missile technology and related issues, the official document 
underlined that China supports the important role played by the UN and other 
multilateral institutions, and advocates the establishment of a fair and non-
discriminatory multilateral mechanism universally accepted by the international 
community in the field of missile non-proliferation284. These clarifications on the 
orientation of China’s policy-making in dealing with issues related to arms control, 
disarmament and non-proliferation will be essential to our understanding of the 
decisions related to North Korea’s missiles and nuclear tests.  
 
On the matter of the international environment and power distribution, 
China’s National Defense Paper of 2004 underlined that complicated security 
factors in the Asia-Pacific region were on the increase:  
The United States is realigning and reinforcing its military presence in this 
region by buttressing military alliances and accelerating deployment of 
missile defense systems. Japan is stepping up its constitutional overhaul, 
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adjusting its military and security policies and developing the missile 
defense system for future deployment. It has also markedly increased 
military activities abroad285. 
 
It is fair to suggest that such considerations were influenced by 
Washington’s mid-2004 announcement that the United States was redeploying its 
forces had raised eyebrows in China. In a statement, the White House had indicated 
that for the Asian region, the United States would “improve its ability to deter, 
dissuade, and defeat challenges through strengthened long-range strike 
capabilities, streamlined and consolidated headquarters, and a network of access 
arrangements”. For example, more aircraft carriers would be stationed in facilities 
in Hawaii, Japan, Okinawa, and Guam. These considerations prompted some cadres 
to dispute whether Beijing should change its long-standing geopolitical strategy of 
“seeking cooperation and avoiding confrontation” with the United States286. 
 
Subsequently, in the first half of 2005, having apparently steadied the course 
in the Middle East, the Bush administration seemed to be turning to Asia. In 
Beijing’s eyes, the new doctrine of containment was spelled out during a visit by 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to Tokyo as part of her Asian tour of March 
2005. Echoing President Bush’s State of the Union address which pushed a foreign 
policy predicated upon “spreading democracy”, Rice noted that “even China must 
eventually embrace some form of open, genuinely representative government”. She 
dropped hints that the United States would bring about a democratic China through 
joint actions with countries including Japan, South Korea, and India. The same 
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points were made by Bush himself during a brief visit to Beijing in November 
2005287. 
 
In response to the trends in the international political, economic, and 
security spheres, the years 2004 and 2005 would go down in history as a turning 
point in Chinese diplomacy. As Lam (2006) points out, “[s]uddenly, Beijing’s senior 
cadres, diplomats, and foreign affairs specialists in the army and foreign-trade 
departments seemed all guns blazing in different parts of the globe288”. The 
leadership seemed eager to maintain a peaceful global climate – particularly good 
ties with China’s neighbours – so as to ensure continual economic development, 
and counter the “anti-China containment policy” allegedly pushed forward by 
Washington289. Beijing’s foreign and security policy goals at the time, included for 
example, seeking a strategic partnership with EU countries in the interest of 
constructing a “multipolar” world order, promoting good will with China’s 
neighbours to secure a “harmonious environment” for economic growth, building 
solid relationships with key countries in Africa and Latin America, and securing a 
long-term supply of petroleum and other precious resources290.  
 
Among CCP leaders, Lam (2006) observes, Hu and colleagues such as Wen 
Jiabao are the first to take a comprehensive approach to security and diplomatic 
issues. Apart from focusing on traditional concerns such as diplomacy and military 
affairs, Hu and his team have been paying more attention to the foreign-policy 
implications of trade, economic cooperation, technology, and energy. For example, 
the 2004 White Paper noted that apart from foreign and military affairs, leading 
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cadres must take into consideration areas including information technology (IT), 
energy, finance, and even “environmental security291”.  
 
Implications for China’s DPRK Policy 
Both tests were conducted, at a time when negotiations within the Six-Party 
Talks had stalled. After all parties agreed to a Joint Statement in September 2005, 
the fifth round of negotiations was scheduled to take place the following month. 
However, the process was interrupted over North Korea’s protests that the United 
States had frozen the regime’s funds in Macau. Indeed, after what had been billed as 
a breakthrough at the Six-Party Talks, the US Treasury Department had issued a 
statement branding Banco Delta Asia (BDA), based in Macau, as a “pawn” of North 
Korea’s alleged money-laundering, and pressured the bank to freeze around $24 
million worth of North Korean assets for February the next year. The United States’ 
freeze campaign was suspected to be a bargaining chip to resolve the standoff over 
North Korea’s nuclear programs292. 
 
First, concerning the ballistic missile tests, it is important to note that while 
they were conducted in early July, a series of reports on the imminent tests had 
already been diffused in June. When intelligence confirmed that North Korea was 
going to test-fire long-range missiles capable of reaching the west coast of the 
United States, the reactions of Japan and the US fundamentally changed, and 
pressure on China increased293. The Chinese leadership came to realize that its 
neighbour would not call off its plan, and for the first time in the history of the two 
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countries’ diplomatic relationship, the Chinese premier openly demanded that the 
DPRK halt its “erroneous” action. On 28 June 2006, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao 
openly called on North Korea to stop the test-launch. As Feng (2009) points out, 
this reaction was unprecedented as China’s senior leaders had never officially 
demanded anything of North Korea, even when the latter withdrew from the 
nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), reopened its 5-megawatt graphite reactor 
or when it declared possession of nuclear weapons in February 2005294. 
Nevertheless, without prior notice, even to Chinese officials, the North Korean 
regime launched the missile tests. 
 
Under the circumstances, North Korea’s show of force was significant, as it 
damaged Beijing’s credibility as a mediator and decreased its presumed influence 
on North Korea295. China had hoped that through a multilateral mechanism such as 
the Six-Party Talks, it could have facilitate negotiations between North Korea and 
the other parties, but the intransigent behaviour and thinking of Pyongyang despite 
five rounds of six-party talks and the signing of the Joint Statement in September 
2005, proved otherwise296. Translated in terms of capabilities, it was a blow to 
China’s prestige and status in international affairs. Opening the door to criticism of 
its policies by its counterparts, China’s diplomatic weight could be considerably 
undermined.  
 
Less than a week after the tests, the UN Security Council agreed to put off a 
vote on a draft resolution that would slap sanctions on the DPRK over its missile 
tests. This was after receiving Japan’s formal draft resolution on July 7, asking for 
sanctions against the DPRK. The draft, co-sponsored by Britain, France and the 
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United States, invoked Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which authorizes sanctions or 
even military action. China, on the other hand, had introduced a draft UN Security 
Council presidential statement, which does not bear the weight of a resolution, 
expressing that it disapproved the missile launches, but urged the DPRK as well as 
other countries in the region to show restraint and refrain from any action that 
might aggravate tension, and continue to work on the resolution of non-
proliferation concern through political and diplomatic efforts297.  
 
After revision and a vote on the matter, UN Security Council members 
unanimously agreed to UN Resolution 1695, which urged the DPRK "to cease the 
development, testing, deployment and proliferation of ballistic missiles and return 
to its moratorium on missile launching”. It also called upon member states to 
prevent the transfer of missiles, missiles-related materials and financing resources 
to "end users involved in or supplying to DPRK's missile and weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) programs298”. In a statement attached to the UN resolution, 
Chinese Ambassador to the United Nations Wang Guangya, expressed his 
government’s regret and concern about the new complicated factors on the Korean 
peninsula, and recalled that China had always been committed to maintaining 
peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, and insisted on resolving the relevant 
issues through peaceful dialogue and negotiations299.  
 
As for the issue of the nuclear test, Zhang Liangui, professor of International 
Strategic research at the Party School of the China Communist Party Central 
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Committee, had observed that in the aftermath of the nuclear test, China was 
caught in a difficult bind. On the one hand, since a North Korea with nuclear 
weapons was not in China’s interests or the common interests of humankind, as a 
responsible power, China had to take a clear stand of opposition. Otherwise, its 
international image and prestige could have been severely tarnished. On the other 
hand, unequivocal opposition from China toward the DPRK was bound to cause 
vicious reprisal, certainly leading to degradation of the Sino-DPRK relations300. In 
his article «Coping with a Nuclear North Korea», he summarized precisely why 
security concerns for China emanated from the now-revealed nuclear weapon 
program of its ally: 
North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons may push China into a new 
security dilemma in Northeast Asia. For a long time, in Chinese strategic 
thinking, the American military presence in Northeast Asia has been a 
latent threat to China’s national security. Until now, it is because of the U.S. 
nuclear umbrella that Japan has exercised self-control in terms of 
developing nuclear weapons. But with North Korea’s possession of nuclear 
weapons, only through U.S. military presence and nuclear deterrence in 
Northeast Asia will Japan, and possibly South Korea and Taiwan, might be 
dissuaded from developing nuclear weapons themselves in the future. 
China would then be in a position of having to choose between two 
unfavourable alternatives: accepting Japan and South Korea with their own 
nuclear weapons or cementing a high-profile U.S. military presence in 
Northeast Asia301. 
 
Furthermore, the move by Pyongyang not only clearly ran counter to its 
promise to keep the Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weapons, but also revealed 
that the leadership had made the decision to develop and possess nuclear 
weapons302. For a long period, there has been a theory that North Korea’s claim to 
develop nuclear weapons was a bluff, that it had not the ability to carry it 
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through303. Despite having signed the NPT in the mid-1980s, the Joint Declaration 
on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula with South Korea in 1992, and the 
Agreed Framework with the U.S. in 1994, it seems that North Korea didn’t have the 
intention to stop its nuclear program throughout this time304. 
 
After news of the UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution had 
spread, Chinese Ambassador to the UN Wang Guangya offered, on October 14, 
explanatory remarks on the vote of UN Resolution 1718. He mentioned the fact that 
China “believe[s] the act of the Security Council should both indicate the firm 
position of the international community and help create enabling conditions for the 
final peaceful solution to the DPRK nuclear issue through dialogue”. “As the 
resolution has basically reflected the above spirit”, Wang said, “the Chinese 
delegation has voted in favour of this resolution305”. If we recall the official 
document on arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation of 2005, we can say 
that there is a concordance between proposed policy orientations and the present 
decision. Subsequently, a press conference held in October 17, Foreign Ministry 
spokesman Liu Jianchao confirmed the government’s decision to accept the UN 
Resolution: “As a permanent member of the Security Council, China has always 
been earnest and responsible in implementing relevant solutions of the Security 
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Council. There is no exception this time. China will deal with relevant issues in 
compliance with the Resolution306”. 
 
Hypothesis 2 – Ideology 
Observations of Hu Jintao’s leadership, a few years after the political 
succession of November 2002, cannot ignore the fact that great effort had been 
invested in the promotion of the Party’s ideological value and principles. Interested 
in Hu Jintao’s role in the reformulation of the CCP ideology, Heike Holbig (2009) 
mentioned that his early pilgrimages to Xibaipo, the village where Communist 
leaders established their base between 1947-1948, and other historical sites of the 
Communist Revolution, his handshakes with members of the working masses, and 
his televised reproduction of memorized Marxist and Maoist tenets were designed 
to evoke core elements of party ideology307. As a former president of the Central 
Party School, Hu had done thorough research on ideology and governance 
matters308, and skilfully used his background to foster political and ideological 
unity. 
 
Evidences of such valorisation of ideology included the Central Committee of 
the CCP’s endorsement of a resolution entitled Strengthening the Construction of the 
Party’s Governing Capacity which demanded that Marxism take on the “guiding 
status” (zhudao diwei) in the ideological sphere in September 2004, and the CCP’s 
launch of a new Academy of Marxism under the auspices of the prestigious Chinese 
Academy of Social Science and bestowed it with the mission of modernizing 
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Marxist theory in late 2005309. In terms of international affairs, Lam (2006) noted 
that the basic thrust of the governing philosophy and worldview of the Hu Jintao-
Wen Jiabao team, had become clear by late 2005. Both leading figures being what 
China calls “within-the-system reformers”, not Gorbatchev-like figures, the fourth-
generation of leaders’ basic philosophy was that they must balance the needs of the 
Party’s self-preservation with the requirements of reform310. Thus, we can assume 
that under the current leadership, the CCP’s political preservation concern would 
be translated as China’s national interests, and noticeably transpire in domestic as 
well as foreign policy decisions311. 
 
Party Principles and UN Security Council Resolutions 1695, 1718 
First, if we take a look at the scope of UN Resolution 1695 to condemn North 
Korea’s missile tests, the approved articles prohibited all member states from 
selling, buying or transferring missile and missile-related items, materials, goods 
and technology to or from the DPRK, and called on members to prevent the transfer 
of financial resources in relation to the DPRK’s missile and WMD programs312. If the 
resolution was addressed to North Korea this time, for the Chinese leaders it might 
have been a way to show China’s general positions regarding the management of 
disagreements between states. Assuming that Pyongyang had used the missile 
launches to show its discontent with the United States principally, this was, in the 
eyes of the Chinese, antagonistic to Party principles of mutual non-aggression, and 
peaceful coexistence. Furthermore, the principle of equality and mutual benefit to 
develop relations between China and other countries which refers to the notion of 
non-discrimination, can work both ways, non-discrimination when fostering 
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relationships, but also non-discrimination when dealing with such issues as the use 
of missile technology. The message of China accepting the UN Resolution was sent 
to all other states that were considering the idea of using such confrontational 
measures, regardless of their relationship with China. 
 
On the UN Resolution 1718 to condemn the nuclear test, the acquiescence of 
the leadership in imposing economic reforms to the North Korean regime raised 
speculation about China stiffening its posture. However, the resolution was mainly 
designed to target North Korea’s nuclear and missile development, and to bar its 
importation of heavy-class conventional weaponry as well as luxury items which 
appeal to Pyongyang’s elite. In this sense, it has managed not to affect North 
Korea’s basic economic realm313. As noted by Xiao Ren (2007), China’s agreement 
to UN Resolution 1718 should be understood as balancing a strong Security Council 
response, and the desirable goal of a peaceful resolution. Sanctions are only a 
means and not an end in themselves314.  
 
It is important to consider that the decision stemmed largely from China’s 
interpretation of the North Korean leadership’s move, amidst ongoing efforts to 
save the Six-Party talks. Everyone knows that the pursuit of nuclear technology 
requires great human ingenuity, massive material and financial resources, all 
underpinned by long-term sustained effort, and considering North Korea’s 
precarious conditions, such a show of force reflected the DPRK’s prioritization of 
military build-up at the expense of economic improvement, which frustrated China, 
who had kept investing in the stability of the regime. The conditions in North Korea 
remind Chinese leaders of the process China had embarked on to avoid political 
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change, that is, by resolving economic problems and strengthening regime security 
based on economic performance and public support. Like China did when it 
decided to reform, North Korea would need foreign relations, especially with the 
United States, to boost its economy, but to do that, trust was a key prerequisite315. 
By conducting the tests, it inevitably raised concern for the international 
community, slowed reconciliation with the parties concerned, and hindered 
prospects for the establishment of economic ties with foreign countries. 
 
Moreover, Xiao (2007) reminds us that the nuclear issue is only part of a 
broader picture for Beijing, since Korean security, as a comprehensive and complex 
matter, involves other important issues such as border stability, economic 
migration, illicit activities, and so forth. All those concerns transcend the porous 
DPRK-China border and affect local social stability and national security, and 
therefore should be taken into consideration as well316. Since China’s intentions 
include peaceful management of its relationship with the DPRK and the intent to 
preserve the status quo on the peninsula, rather than securing leverage over North 
Korean affairs, the leadership does not seem to aspire to use its economic leverage 
to control outcomes317. 
 
Given its socialist political ideology, and as a country where its sole Party’s 
Constitution endorses the five principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's 
internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence, as a basis for 
developping relations with other countries, and a nation deeply committed to 
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fostering its economic development, it was unlikely that those two UN Resolutions 
China agreed on, would include provisions that could threaten the fellow 
Communist regime or that could be perceived as a way to intrude in its internal 
affairs. 
 
Hypothesis 3 – Decision Unit 
Jiang passed on his post as Chairman of the CMC to Hu Jintao in September 
2004. While it doesn’t mean his influence has stopped being felt among the decision 
unit and Party members in general, it will surely leave more space for Hu Jintao and 
his advisers to use their expertise, “seek truth from facts”, and approach 
international issues according to their own worldview. At the Sixth Plenum of the 
16th CPC Central Committee held in Beijing on Oct. 8-11, a communiqué was issued 
highlighting the issue of building a harmonious socialist society. It stressed that the 
role of the CCP itself was crucial for the construction of a harmonious society, and 
urged Party members to strengthen ideological and moral cultivation. It also 
underlined that CCP's efforts in improving governance capacity and maintaining 
advanced nature were the political guarantee for this achievement, calling on the 
leadership and cadres at various levels to improve their capability of leading 
people. The communiqué reminded that democratic centralism should be adhered 
to and improved318. 
 
In «Shifting Tides: China and North Korea», a contribution to the book The 
Architecture of Security in the Asia-Pacific, Zhu Feng indicates that any ultimate 
decision regarding Beijing’s policy toward North Korea is directly subject to 
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judgment and selection at the highest level, but notes that the implication of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which focuses on coordination with the international 
community, and the International Department of the Chinese Communist Party’s 
Central Committee (CCPCC), which plays an important role in dealing with 
“delicate” countries such as the DPRK319, has also had an influence over that 
policy320. According to Zhu, while the former camp can hardly be called a ‘pro-West’ 
group, it does advocate coordination with the West. On the other hand, the latter 
camp can be called ‘pro-Pyongyang’ and advocates strongly for cooperation with 
North Korea. “The CCPCC’s International Department oversees exchange with other 
political parties and is generally sympathetic to North Korea”, he says, “often calling 
for a strengthened relationship between the Chinese and the North Korean political 
parties and governments and advocating full “political trust” in Pyongyang321”. 
 
More importantly, Zhu went further in disclosing that Hu’s proactive and 
rational international policy approach was facing challenges from within. He argues 
that the missile launches and nuclear test only provided the ossified forces within 
the conservative camp that were originally discontent with Hu and Wen and their 
new style government, with new fodder for attacking the Hu-Wen team322. “In the 
run up to the 17th Party Congress, Chinese politics are now entering a sensitive 
period”, he says, and North Korea’s actions have, on balance, damaged the 
diplomatic prestige of the Chinese reformists represented by Hu and Wen. If 
China’s policy toward North Korea is dragged into the domestic struggle over 
political power, the future orientation of China’s diplomatic policies towards North 
Korea will become even more complicated323. The same nine members of the 
Politburo Standing Committee that had taken part in a welcoming ceremony for 
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Dear Leader Kim Jong-il’s three-day visit to Beijing in April 2004324, were now 
pressured to deliberate on its response to North Korea’s actions. 
 
Decision in Response to North Korea’s Missile Tests 
Considering the relative promptness of the Chinese leadership in accepting 
UN Resolution 1695, we can assume that disagreements among the group of 
decision-makers were less critical in defining the official response325. Since the 
resolution did not include reference to Charter VII of the UN Charter, allowing 
measures such as military action, and did not contain “punitive” measures such as 
economic sanctions, it was conform to China’s policy predispositions. In addition, 
since Pyongyang’s show of force was a blow to the Chinese leaders who had 
worked on fostering their “partnership” through bilateral meetings and tried to 
convince the regime to refrain from launching the missiles, we can assume that the 
decision unit members were more conscious about their identity to the group, 
unlike what was detected with the previous issue. The decision-makers might have 
debated on whether it should condemn formally the act through the UN Security 
Council, or only convey its concern over a public statement, but on the matter of the 
provisions included in the UN Resolution 1695, as long as none would aggravate 
the domestic situation of the DPRK, unanimity was likely to be reached within the 
decision unit, denoting a small shift from initial preferences326. 
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Decision to Accept UN Resolution 1718 Condemning North Korea’s 
Nuclear Test 
Again, China’s response to the nuclear test was issued less than a week after 
the incident, which decreases the likelihood of strong disagreement within the 
decision unit group. The decision to condemn the missile tests, through UN 
jurisdiction, had been accepted by the leadership a month ago, and it would stick to 
the same principles and intentions for the nuclear test. This time, however, Choo 
(2008) noted that although Beijing agreed on many other articles presented in the 
draft of the UN Resolution 1718, its opposition centered on the character of the 
resolution. Clearly, Chinese representatives strongly opined that the article related 
to sanctions should be limited to economic ones. Chinese officials were aware that 
the article could provoke Pyongyang’s withdrawal from the Six-party Talks327. 
 
What might have convinced the leadership to vote in favour of the 
resolution despite the inclusion of economic sanctions was that it would not affect 
China’s policy of providing the DPRK with “humanitarian” food and financial aid. In 
a press conference held on October 12 2006, Foreign Ministry Spokesman Liu 
Jianchao, was asked if China’s position on the nature of the sanctions had changed 
after Chinese Permanent Representative to the UN Wang Guangya said the UN 
should take "punitive" action on the DPRK. He rectified that the position of the 
Chinese Government has been consistent: “punishment is not the purpose. We 
should take effective, appropriate and well-measured step to make all parties 
aware that the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula serves the interest of 
all328”. While the resolution’s enforcement depends on voluntary implementation 
and reporting by member states, with no compulsory enforcement mechanism in 
                                                        
327 Choo, «Mirroring North Korea...», p.369. 
328 «Full text: FM press conference on October 12». October 15, 2006. China Daily. Online. 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-10/15/content_708369.htm (page accessed 12 December 
2011). 
103 
 
place, it was reported that China did take some steps to implement the provisions 
of UN Resolution 1718, such as, increased inspection of cargo trucks crossing the 
China-North Korean border, a non-renewal of visas for North Koreans working in 
China, and the extension of a barbed-wire fence on the China-North Korea 
border329. 
 
North Korea’s Shelling of Yeonpyeong Island (2010) 
On November 23, 2010, North Korea unleashed an artillery barrage on 
Yeonpyeong Island, situated in the disputed border area between North and South 
Korea, which contains both a military garrison and a small fishing community. The 
attack, seen as the most serious single military incident since the end of the Korean 
War of 1950-1953, killed two South Korean marines and two civilians, injured 
more than eighteen people, and set the South on a war footing330. Five months 
prior, in late July, the United States and South Korea had agreed on conducting U.S.-
led joint military exercises in the South China Sea (Yellow Sea), which would be 
staged once a month throughout the year331. This was clearly a catalyst, as seem to 
suggest North Korean statements, but not everyone perceived it that way. As China 
chose not to criticize North Korea for the artillery barrage, and instead, gave equal 
prominence in the state-run media to North Korea’s claim that the United States 
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masterminded the crisis332, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak and United 
States President Obama openly professed their discontent. 
 
Hypothesis 1 – Leadership’s Perception of Power 
Compared to previous Chinese National Defense Papers, the one of 2008 
gave bigger emphasis to the notions of status and prestige, as elements of power. In 
the preface, we could read:  
Historic changes have taken place in the relations between contemporary 
China and the rest of the world. The Chinese economy has become an 
important part of the world economy, China has become an important 
member of the international system, and the future and destiny of China 
have been increasingly closely connected with the international 
community. China cannot develop in isolation from the rest of the world, 
nor can the world enjoy prosperity and stability without China333. 
 
This was added to the economic and socio-political aspects of “comprehensive power” 
included in the previous White Papers, as well as military attributes integrated in the 
national defense policy solely aimed at protecting China’s territory and people, and 
endeavoring to build, together with other countries, a harmonious world of 
enduring peace and common prosperity334. 
 
The 2008 White Paper also stressed that the trends in world affairs generated 
rising insecurities, with world peace and development being faced with multiple 
difficulties and challenges. “Struggles for strategic resources, strategic locations and 
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strategic dominance have intensified”, it says, “Meanwhile, hegemonism and power 
politics still exist, regional turmoil keeps spilling over, hot-spot issues are increasing, 
and local conflicts and wars keep emerging335”. The same applied to the economic field, 
with the financial crisis triggered by the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis causing a 
snowball effect. Economic risks were said to reveal a more interconnected, systematic 
and global nature, pointing out issues such as terrorism, environmental disasters, climate 
change, serious epidemics, transnational crime and pirates are becoming increasingly 
prominent336 . Meanwhile, the influence of military security factors on international 
relations was also considered to be mounting:  
Driven by competition in overall national strength and the development of 
science and technology, international military competition is becoming 
increasingly intense, and the worldwide revolution in military affairs 
(RMA) is reaching a new stage of development. Some major powers are 
realigning their security and military strategies, increasing their defense 
investment, speeding up the transformation of armed forces, and 
developing advanced military technology, weapons and equipment. 
Strategic nuclear forces, military astronautics, missile defense systems, and 
global and battlefield reconnaissance and surveillance have become top 
priorities in their efforts to strengthen armed forces. Some developing 
countries are also actively seeking to acquire advanced weapons and 
equipment to increase their military power. All countries are attaching 
more importance to supporting diplomatic struggles with military means. 
As a result, arms races in some regions are heating up, posing grave 
challenges to the international arms control and nonproliferation regime337. 
 
Apart from these global circumstances, rising concerns converge around the 
Obama administration’s seeking a bigger role in Asia. A series of episodes all 
pointed to the same direction that Washington followed the footsteps of the 
previous administration, and beyond. For example, US Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton's October 27-November 8 trip to the Asia Pacific region was a sign that the US 
was making a bold comeback to Asia's regional affairs. According to Wang Hui 
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(2010), in an apparent attempt to fan anti-China sentiments among the country's 
smaller Asian neighbours, Clinton chose the ASEAN Regional Forum, a meeting on 
Asian security held in Hanoi, to show off the US' open support of nations that have 
territorial disputes with China over the South China Sea. Chinese Foreign Minister 
Yang Jiechi characterized Clinton’s comments as “an attack on China”, adding that 
“Beijing has always opposed any effort to “internationalize” the issue338. The US 
meddling in the South China Sea issue is widely perceived as another move to 
provoke China's interests, since a bigger presence of Washington in Asia's regional 
affairs will inevitably disrupt the current political and strategic equilibrium339. 
 
Prior to the shelling by the DPRK, the head of the Chinese delegation to the 
UN Wang Qun had issued, in November 7, a statement on security challenges and 
the need to foster a peaceful and stable international environment, fully respect 
and accommodate the legitimate and reasonable security concerns of all countries, 
conduct dialogue and cooperation on an equal footing and build state-to-state 
relations of mutual understanding and mutual trust, adhere to multilateralism, and 
consolidate the collective security system with the United Nations at its core340. “To 
advance the international disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation 
process, joint and unremitting efforts are called for on the part of the entire 
international community341”. We can presume that the US-ROK (Republic of Korea, 
South Korea) joint-military exercises that took place close to North Korea’s border 
went against that mindset. 
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Implications for China’s Response to the North Korean Offensive 
Following news of the artillery on Yeonpyeong Island, Chinese Premier Wen 
Jiaobao, during a meeting with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in Moscow, 
called for all parties concerned to exercise utmost restraint342. He stressed that the 
international community should do more to ease the ongoing tension, bringing 
special attention to Russia and China under the circumstances and to the 
resumption of the Six-Party Talks aimed at denuclearizing North Korea343 . 
Similarly, during a press briefing, Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said China 
was highly concerned about Tuesday's incident, and was worried about the 
developments. “The Chinese side strongly urges the two Koreas to remain calm, 
exercise restraint and start dialogue and contact as soon as possible to avoid the 
recurrence of similar incidents344”. 
 
Although the United States pressed China to constrain North Korea to 
prevent further “provocative incidents345”, and South Korean President Lee Myung-
bak strongly commented that Beijing was not exerting enough pressure on North 
Korea, calling on China to contribute to peace in a "more objective, responsible" 
manner346, the Chinese leadership’s stance did not change. Instead, it only went 
further in deploying consecutive diplomatic efforts in response to what might have 
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turned into an intensification of the conflict. To be sure, the term “provocative 
incidents” used by the United States didn’t seem to apply to them, considering the 
US-South Korea military drills conducted every month near North Korean territory. 
In fact, the next day after the strike, the aircraft carrier USS George Washington was 
dispatched for a show of solidarity with the South, about a hundred miles south of 
Yeonpyeong Island. 
 
It is important to note that when it comes to Korea, Chinese leaders are 
always conscious about conflict escalation. A more aggressive response, despite 
divergent views on what triggered the strike, could have trigger a bigger conflict, 
with North Korea feeling cornered. From an outlook of power and international 
affairs dynamics, China does not want the North Korean government to fall, 
because it could instigate a unification of the two Koreas, with major U.S. influence, 
which is not welcomed by China. Concretely, the North Korean territory keeps at 
bay the tens of thousands of U.S. troops stationed in South Korea, and this allows 
China to reduce its military deployment in the Northeast347. Internal breakdowns in 
North Korea, and/or U.S. presence near China’s north-eastern regions, would 
necessitate, at minimum, strengthening Chinese border defences, meaning a 
probable need to move troops, equipment, and security and intelligence assets348. 
As Shen Dingli (2006) commented, some might think that China has helped North 
Korea without getting anything in return, but if we think from a geopolitical and 
political perspective, the fact that North Korea has been an ally for more than 50 
years provided China with this many years of peace. For all the money spent on aid 
to encourage stability in North Korea, China has in essence helped itself349. 
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Whereas, from an ideological perspective, the fall of the DPRK, a communist 
ally, would be another case of a socialist regime’s failure, which could trigger 
political domestic complications for China, à la Tiananmen, and growing pressures 
from foreign states for China’s democratization. The one-party authoritarian 
political system had survived after the Soviet empire’s decline and the fall of the 
communist governments in East Europe, which were, according to Chinese 
decision-makers, determined by their domestic failures, and the East European 
experience had convinced Beijing that, to stay in power and make the system work, 
the Chinese Communist Party had no choice but to continue and deepen the 
economic reform350. But could the actual, fourth and fifth-generations of leaders 
manage a resurging legitimacy crisis?  
 
Hypothesis 2 – Ideology 
Based on the constant emphasis on Party building and on the updating and 
upgrading of the Party’s ideology since the 16th Party Congress to the 17th Party 
Congress of 2007, we may suspect they would struggle a bit. In 2010, Hu Jintao’s 
leadership was as highly devoted to the promotion of the Chinese Communist Party 
ideology as it was in 2006, if not more. Evidence of this was that in October 21 
2007, a newly amended party constitution was adopted by the CCP National 
Congress, revealing for the first time many landmark changes in its major political, 
economic and social guidelines and policies. Scientific Outlook on Development, a 
new theoretical development of the Party in the past five years, as well as policies 
to boost democracy at intra-Party and government sphere and expand democracy 
were enshrined in the amendment. Among other things, the general program of the 
amended Party constitution raised new requirements for the Party members and 
cadres, stressing the need to study the Scientific Outlook on Development and legal 
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knowledge, to take the lead in its application, to foster a correct view on evaluating 
their performances, and to improve their moral standards. Also added as Party 
members' duties, was the task to take the lead in putting into practice the socialist 
maxims of honor and disgrace351. Again, democratic centralism was pointed as the 
basis for decision making. 
 
With respect to foreign affairs, Hu Jintao's report delivered at the 17th 
National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) on Oct. 15, 2007, extolled 
the major progress made in all-directional diplomacy. The report said that, 
“pursuing an independent foreign policy of peace, China energetically carried out 
diplomatic activities, enhanced exchanges and cooperation with other countries in 
various fields and played a major constructive role in international affairs. This 
created a favourable international environment for building a moderately 
prosperous society in all respects352”. Having been itself a victim of foreign 
aggression, China and its leaders were said to be committed to combining the 
interests of the Chinese people with the common interests of the people of other 
countries, and always stand for fairness and justice.  
We maintain that all countries, big and small, strong and weak, rich and 
poor, are equal. We respect the right of the people of all countries to 
independently choose their own development path. We will never interfere 
in the internal affairs of other countries or impose our own will on them. 
China works for peaceful settlement of international disputes and hotspot 
issues, promotes international and regional security cooperation353. 
 
This would denote China’s response to North Korea’s strike in November 
2010, as a mix of power and prestige concerns, as well as ideological concerns 
                                                        
351 «CPC Publishes Key Policy Changes in Party Constitution ». October 26, 2007. People's Daily Online. 
Online. http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90785/6291002.html. 
352 Full Text of Hu Jintao's Report at 17th Party Congress. October 25, 2007. People's Daily Online. Online. 
http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/66102/6290205.html (page accessed 26 April 2012). 
353 Ibid. 
111 
 
surfaced with the increasing presence of the U.S. in Asia, and mounting insecurity 
felt by its ally, the DPRK. The United States and South Korea did not seem 
concerned about the impact of their military exercises on the North Korean regime, 
especially after the UN Security Council condemnations of the missile launches and 
second nuclear test in 2009, and after the Six-Party Talks had failed to produce any 
commitments from both, North Korean and U.S., sides. 
 
Party Principles and the Issue of the Shelling of Yeonpyeong Island 
Beijing’s motto with respect to the Korean Peninsula issues has always been 
to maintain a peaceful and stable environment, in order to minimize the risks of 
consequences to China’s domestic interests, primarily, the economic development, 
and political stability. But for this particular issue, it seems that the destabilizing 
factors were perceived by the Chinese leadership as emanating from the U.S. 
presence, more than from North Korea’s behaviour. Therefore, the response to the 
shelling was first “inaction”, only commenting on it in the press, and thereafter, to 
stick with its multilateral cooperation mindset, the leadership called for emergency 
consultations among the heads of delegation to the Six-Party Talks in December 
2010, “as tensions rise on the Korean Peninsula354”. 
 
We can better grasp China’s interpretation of the issue, if we look at the 
following section of an address by Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi at the First Lanting 
Forum on December 1st 2010:  
Diversity and complexity are a distinctive feature of the Asia Pacific. 
Countries in this region have diverse political and economic systems, 
histories, cultures and social development models, which have grown side 
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by side over the long years of history. Diversity is a source of the unique 
strength and enduring vitality for the Asia Pacific. We need to uphold this 
tradition, carry forward the spirit of openness, inclusiveness, seeking 
common ground while reserving differences, mutual understanding and 
mutual accommodation, and strengthen mutual learning and people-to-
people and cultural exchanges, so as to build the Asia Pacific into a 
community in which diverse nations and cultures live in peace and 
friendship355. 
 
Hypothesis 3 – Decision Unit 
Again referring to the 17th Party Congress report of October 2007, the 
document included new recommendations concerning decision-making, such as the 
need to strengthen the institutions of standing committees of people's congresses 
and improve their membership composition in terms of intellectual background 
and age. To make it possible, it was said the leaders would support the Chinese 
People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) in performing its functions 
centered on the two major themes of unity and democracy and improve the system 
of political consultation, democratic oversight, and participation in the deliberation 
and administration of state affairs356. “We will incorporate political consultation in 
decision-making procedures, improve democratic oversight and ensure that the 
CPPCC participates in the deliberation and administration of state affairs more 
effectively357”.  
 
Furthermore, to ensure scientific and democratic decision-making, the 
report assured that actions would be done to improve the information and 
intellectual support for it, increase its transparency and expand public 
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participation in it358. In the same mindset, the report underlined the need to 
improve the mechanism of restraint and oversight, as well as ensure that power 
entrusted by the people was always exercised in their interests.  
Power must be exercised in the sunshine to ensure that it is 
exercised correctly. We must have institutions to govern power, work and 
personnel, and establish a sound structure of power and a mechanism for 
its operation in which decision-making, enforcement and oversight powers 
check each other and function in coordination359. 
 
These recommendations and demands could be interpreted both as a pledge to 
rectify past abuses and misconducts, or to prevent such wrongdoings to happen in 
the future. However, it remains difficult to know the extent to which this concerns 
foreign policy decision making in 2010, since we are left with only a vague 
apprehension of what actually happens within the group of decision makers. We 
cannot fully appreciate the conditions behind deliberations, such as whether Hu 
Jintao, or someone else, exercises a predominant role and influence decisions, or if 
there are profound disagreements between the members who come from very 
different backgrounds. 
 
In September 2009, Party members met again at the 4th Plenum of the 17th 
Party Congress to update the Party Line and reiterate core principles and 
expectations. But one thing caught the attention of both Chinese and foreign 
observers, it was the fact that Vice-president Xi Jinping, who is expected to replace 
Hu as CCP general secretary at the 18th Party Congress in 2012, was not inducted 
into the policy-setting Central Military Commission (CMC). Recalling Hu Jintao’s 
access to higher posts in the early stages of the fourth-generation leadership’s rise 
to power, he had inherited the post of Vice-chairman of the CMC in 1999, three 
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years before his succession to Jiang Zemin360. While Hu’s speech to the plenum 
stressed the expansion of intra-party democracy and reform of the party cadre to 
raise governance ability, as Willy Lam (2009) comments, Xi’s failure to make the 
CMC cast doubt on the smoothness of the upcoming transition of power361. Will Hu 
Jintao hold on to his post of CMC chairman like Jiang Zemin had done previously? 
We will know soon enough, with the 18th Party Congress approaching. But for now, 
we only know that Xi Jinping was eventually appointed as vice-chairman of the CMC 
at the fifth plenum of the Party Congress on October 2010, one month prior to the 
North Korean strike on the island. 
 
Also noteworthy at the time, was the Chinese government’s appointment of 
former Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei, in early February 2010, as special 
representative for Korean Peninsula affairs. The ministry said in a press release 
that Wu would be in charge of the Six-Party Talks and related issues. Wu, who 
served as the deputy director-general of the Ministry's Asian Affairs Department, 
China's ambassador to the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan as well as Vice 
foreign minister, is said to be well-informed about the Korean Peninsula 
situation362. 
 
Decision for Inaction 
Besides deep concerns over the fact that the exchange of fires between the 
two Koreas was an unprecedented incident of such nature since the Korean War, 
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what resonated broadly in the aftermath of the attack, both in foreign news articles 
and within the South Korean community, was China’s quiet response following the 
report of the attack. While South Korean President Lee wished for China to use its 
leverage on North Korea, American officials had wanted China to single out the 
North as an aggressor in this case 363 . For example, the U.S. House of 
Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs and the House Armed Services 
Committee called on China to suspend economic and energy assistance to the DPRK 
to show the consequences for its “aggression364”.  
 
The next day after the shelling, during a visit to Russia, Chinese Premier 
Wen Jiabao urged parties concerned to remain calm and exercise restraint, and 
hoped multilateral cooperation could reduce prospects for escalation. 
Subsequently, during a press briefing, China's Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong 
Lei indicated that the government opposed any act that would undermine peace 
and stability on the peninsula, and that China would not take sides between South 
and North Korea, saying, there was divided opinions over the cause of the 
incident365”. This statement was an indication that negotiations within the group of 
Chinese decision-makers had either led to deadlock, that is, group members could 
not resolve their differences and therefore took no decision366, or considering the 
promptness of the response, that all agreed on the decision to do nothing, no UN 
Resolution, no sanctions. The fact that the incident was an issue between both 
Koreas and did not involve any third-party was with no doubt a factor that shaped 
China’s response. A stronger replied could have generated misunderstandings, not 
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to mention that for the Chinese leadership, it would have meant intervening in a 
state’s internal affairs. 
 
As Zhu Feng, professor at Peking University's School of International 
Studies, explains, China's actions are made out of a respect for other sovereign 
states and humanitarian considerations. He noted that, “[t]here is serious 
misunderstanding and hostility between the DPRK and the Republic of Korea 
(ROK). The best solution is to make every possible effort to bring the parties to 
negotiation to maintain peace”. Only with more contact and dialogue, Zhu said, can 
we ease the current tensions and find a solution acceptable to all367. China was not 
tempted to change its response due to criticism, but rather because the United 
States resumed naval war games with South Korean forces in the Yellow Sea, less 
than a week after the incident, a move that both China and North Korea have 
criticized as provocative368. 
 
Ultimately, on the week-end of November 27-28, China moved to defuse the 
crisis on the Korean Peninsula, publicly calling for “emergency consultations” 
beginning with what amounted to high-level shuttle diplomacy between North and 
South Korea. The moves by China were its first concerted diplomatic intervention 
to calm the emotions that have dangerously escalated since North Korea’s lethal 
shelling369. In a hastily called news conference in Beijing, the Chinese government 
asked for South Korea, North Korea, the United States, Japan and Russia to convene 
what it described as emergency talks in Beijing next month, as a way to avoid a 
further deterioration of the situation. China also sent a top foreign policy official, 
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State Councilor Dai Bingguo, to South Korea over the weekend and announced that 
a North Korean official would travel to Beijing next week, in what appeared to be 
an attempt at mediation, something unusual for China in its complex relationship 
with the Koreas370. 
 
On the 1st of December, in an address on confidence and cooperation in Asia-
pacific, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, offered explanatory remarks on China’s stance 
regarding the Korean peninsula issue: 
As a big responsible country, China decides its position based on 
the merits of each case and does not seek to protect any side. China is of the 
view that the most pressing task now is to prevent any escalation of the 
tension, and nothing should be done to inflame the situation. The parties 
concerned should keep calm and exercise restraint, and work to bring the 
situation back onto the track of dialogue and negotiation371. 
 
Summarizing China’s response to the present issue, what first took the form of a 
hands-off approach, due to diverging views within the decision unit, evolved to 
diplomatic efforts, as the spectre of conflict escalation started to rise. 
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 CHAPTER SIX 
Conclusion 
If we recapitulate the theoretical compound of this study and juxtapose it 
with the analysis of China’s DPRK policy, three propositions were to be tested. First, 
was the assumption that leaders’ perception of relative power distribution has an 
impact on their determination of foreign policy. It was acknowledged that systemic 
pressures may influence the general outline of a state’s policy, but it was the 
perception of these, by the leadership, that could shape its specific response. If we 
take Issue 1, that is, the Second nuclear crisis, we could see that concerns about 
conflict escalation, which emanated from the possible recklessness of the United 
States in trying to end the nuclear standoff, was an important determinant of 
China’s decision to play a proactive role, as a mediator. Similarly, regarding Issue 2 
– the missile launches and nuclear tests – power attributes such as prestige and 
leverage in world affairs were important considerations in the decision to accept 
the UN resolutions, as well as perception of a threat to peace and stability on the 
Korean peninsula and beyond. Issue 3, the strike on Yeonpyeong Island, on the 
other hand, didn’t raise as much security concerns as the other incidents. 
 
Second, the possible impact of ideological predispositions on foreign policy 
decision making was addressed. Since individuals with shared ideas join together 
organizations and institutions that operate in sectors of a state’s policy making 
process, it was fair to wonder if those ideas could shape decisions. The fact that 
China relies on a highly centralized one-party system could not be ignored, and it 
was expected that the Chinese Communist Party ideology, with its principles and 
recommendations for action, would intervene in the process of policy making. 
China’s responses to all three issues gave the impression to be in line with, or were 
justified as being in line with Party principles. 
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The third, and last variable, was the type of decision unit, and how problem-
solving dynamics could affect the choice of a policy options. Since it remains 
difficult to get inside China’s “black box”, of all three hypotheses, this was the one 
who relied most on deduction. To be honest, it was not expected that the results 
inferred from the decision units framework would match China’s actual response to 
each issue, since it did not take into consideration predispositions that could limit 
the range of options for action, such as ideological predispositions. But concretely, 
aren’t organizations created on the basis of ideology? Since ideology serves to 
motivate individuals to give full commitment to the organization, and provides 
individuals a set of rational ideas with which to carry out the actions demanded by 
the organization372, it is not surprising that the structure and process of foreign 
policy decision making at the apex of a government or party is designed to convey 
values and principles of their ideology. 
 
In retrospect, testing three different intervening variables, instead of 
focusing on one or two, has had its advantages and disadvantages. For sure, the 
work was time-consuming, since it necessitated additional theoretical knowledge 
of those variables and expanded the range of elements to monitor when tracing the 
foreign policy decision making. But it proved to be efficient in testing the core 
proposition of neoclassical realism, that, domestic factors come into play in the 
formulation and implementation of foreign policy, as they filter systemic pressures. 
Applying the framework and methods to three situation-related stimuli, in this 
case, the Second nuclear crisis, the ballistic missiles and nuclear tests, and finally, 
the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, was also considered as a way to gather as many 
observations as possible in order to compare the results. 
 
                                                        
372 Schurmann, Ideology and Organization..., 1968. 
120 
 
While the focus of this study was on China’s policy toward one state, the 
DPRK, others could use the same pattern to analyze one state’s foreign policy in 
general (grand strategy) throughout a specific period of time, or its policy toward 
one specific issue, such as, for example, arms control and disarmament, or 
economic cooperation. Indeed, researchers more at ease with the economic field of 
studies could easily have brought to light developments related to trade and other 
compounds of world economy, such as the obtainment of the Most-favoured nation, 
or the accession to WTO, in the analysis of the perception of power variable.  
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